

MILITARY POLICE OPERATIONS IN THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U. S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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B.A., GLASSBORO STATE COLLEGE, NEW JERSEY, 1980

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1995

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

*Form Approved
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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)			2. REPORT DATE 2 June 1995	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis, 2 Aug 94 - 2 Jun 95	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Military Police Operations in the Okinawa Campaign			5. FUNDING NUMBERS		
6. AUTHOR(S) Major James J. Emerson, USMC					
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER		
					
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES			12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.		
			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A		
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) During the World War II campaign to seize the island of Okinawa, Operation Iceberg, U.S. Tenth Army employed a significant U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps military police structure. However, the challenges posed to these units by military traffic, nearly 300,000 enemy civilians, and over 10,000 prisoners of war are issues largely neglected by historians. This study analyzes the overall effectiveness and value of the largest joint military police operation in the Pacific theater. It evaluates military police force structure and operations by assessing pre-campaign planning and results of operations with extant historical doctrine, operational setting, and historical information. Historical military police doctrine is discussed to identify standards which existed in 1945. Intelligence or other information about the operational environment is examined for relevance to doctrine. Finally, historical accounts or information about military police operations are contrasted with doctrine and operational setting. Historical information is assessed within five mission areas; traffic control operations, prisoner of war operations, civilian handling operations, security operations, and law and order operations. Within these mission areas information is further organized by unit, time, and relation to the tactical situation. Detailed assessment and evaluation reveal Tenth Army military police overall effectiveness and value in Operation Iceberg.					
14. SUBJECT TERMS World War II, Joint Operations, Military Police Operations Amphibious Operations, Traffic Control, Prisoners of War, Civilian Handling, Security, Law and Order, Pacific Theater			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 124		
16. PRICE CODE					
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Unlimited		

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
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
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

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

MILITARY POLICE OPERATIONS IN THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN by
Major James J. Emerson, USMC, 117 pages.

During the World War II campaign to seize the island of Okinawa, Operation Iceberg, U.S. Tenth Army employed a significant U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps military police structure. However, the challenges posed to these units by military traffic, nearly 300,000 enemy civilians, and over 10,000 prisoners of war are issues largely neglected by historians.

This study analyzes the overall effectiveness and value of the largest joint military police operation in the Pacific theater. It evaluates military police force structure and operations by assessing pre-campaign planning and results of operations with extant historical doctrine, operational setting, and historical information.

Historical military police doctrine is discussed to identify standards which existed in 1945. Intelligence or other information about the operational environment is examined for relevance to doctrine. Finally, historical accounts or information about military police operations are contrasted with doctrine and operational setting.

Historical information is assessed within five mission areas; traffic control operations, prisoner of war operations, civilian handling operations, security operations, and law and order operations. Within these mission areas information is further organized by unit, time, and relation to the tactical situation. Detailed assessment and evaluation reveal Tenth Army military police overall effectiveness and value in Operation Iceberg.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

To my wife, Sharyn, I could not have succeeded without your encouragement, patience, support, and sacrifice. This thesis is yours also.

To my son, Jimmy, and daughters, Stefany and Samantha, thanks for your mature sense of understanding and encouragement.

To my committee; Col Wood, LTC Noyes, and Dr. Mangrum, your superb advice and support were invaluable.

Finally, to those Marine veterans of Okinawa acknowledged in the bibliography, you have my respect and gratitude for both your accomplishments in "Operation Iceberg" and your enthusiastic support for this thesis. This is your story; Semper Fi!

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Background

The last major World War II operation in the Pacific theater, the Ryukyus Campaign, focused on the island of Okinawa at the southern end of the Ryukyu chain between Formosa and Japan. The invasion of Okinawa, Operation Iceberg, was one of the largest amphibious assaults of the war bringing the ground forces of Admiral Chester A. Nimitz and General Douglas MacArthur together for the first time. U.S. combat and logistical forces numbered 172,000 and 115,000 respectively, slightly less than at Luzon. This force faced 100,000 Japanese defenders and a dense civilian population of 500,000.¹

The joint and combined expeditionary force under the operational direction of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, was assigned the mission to capture, occupy, defend, and develop Okinawa island and establish control of sea and air in the Nansei Shoto area. The mission sought to establish bases from which U.S. forces could attack the Japanese main islands, support operations contiguous to the East China Sea, and sever Japanese lines of communication with Asia, Formosa, Malaya, and the East Indies. U.S. Army and Marine Corps ground and tactical air forces were task organized under U.S. Tenth Army headquarters. The resulting Tenth Army campaign concept was to seize the island of Okinawa, rapidly

improve and develop airfields and port facilities, and exploit this position in the region. In addition to the necessary naval and air forces, planners designed a large joint ground force comprised of U.S. Army XXIV Corps, III Marine Amphibious Corps, Tenth Army reserve made up of one Marine and two Army divisions, and a large army garrison force or island command.²

The Ryukyus Campaign provides a unique and unmatched example of joint and combined integration of services and forces at both the operational and tactical levels.³ The Commander, Fifth Fleet was the overall commander of the operation, the Commander, Amphibious Forces Pacific was the commander of the expeditionary force, and the Commanding General, Tenth Army was the commander of expeditionary troops. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas issued the initial planning directive on 10 October 1944 to initiate preparations for Operation Iceberg. Tenth Army had developed basic command and organization concepts for an operation of this size and scope previously on 16 August 1944. This structure was modified by replacing the Army service area structure with the formation of an Island Command to better facilitate base development, island defense, and military government operations. Combat forces comprised the remainder of the Tenth Army as shown in figure 1.⁴

The requirement for base development and military government operations in the Pacific theater had highlighted the inadequate number of military police organic to the divisions and corps. The Provost Marshal, Far East Command, realized that as operations pushed further into the theater, it would not be practical to evacuate prisoners of war to Australia. As a result, this would require a dramatic increase in the

number of military police units. Additionally, as the U.S. presence continued to "string out" along increasing exterior lines of operation behind advancing campaign fronts, the need for additional military police units to protect installations in theater would also grow. Considering




Figure 1. Tenth Army Structure

this, the Provost Marshal, Far East Command, requested an additional 17,000 military police be provided in theater. The War Department could not fully accommodate this request and formation of provisional military police units became necessary.⁵

Marines were encountering increasing numbers of civilians in their operations as they pushed closer to Japan. Increasing population density and the extreme reactions displayed by Japanese civilians to U.S. forces complicated tactical problems, exposed combat forces to increased risk, and created psychological dilemma.⁶ Thus, the Ryukyus campaign challenged

military police planners to provide classic support to a joint field army, handle an estimated 500,000 enemy civilians, support base development for at least eight airfields, and support development of a Navy operating base at White Beach on Nakagusuku Bay.⁷

Accordingly, within the Tenth Army task organization existed an Army and Marine Corps military police force structure comprised of approximately 3,500 soldiers and Marines. The Army employed three battalions, three separate companies, and six separate platoons of military police, while the Marine Corps employed one battalion and five separate companies of military police. The foregoing force structure is depicted in figure 2. Finally, the Tenth Army Provost Marshal also employed a joint staff comprised of both Army and Marine Corps representatives.⁸

U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, military police planners determined the troop requirements for the Ryukyus campaign. They considered experience gained in past and ongoing operations, studied Okinawa probable needs, and compared them to military police unit availability.⁹ The Provost Marshal, Tenth Army, began planning for the campaign in November 1944. Planners originally recommended a military police structure that was larger than that described above. The creation of provisional military police units was utilized to compensate for military police deficiencies identified by planners. Additionally, there are numerous examples of joint military police task organization in the amalgamated phases I and II of the campaign.¹⁰

Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, was the G-3 for 6th Marine Division during Operation Iceberg. General

Krulak made the following comments regarding military police support during the Okinawa campaign:

You must realize that this was our first real experience with civilians. Military police were used in the classic sense as part of the shore party to help organize the beach area, and as soon as we began to encounter civilians they were given charge of the civilian groups.¹¹




Figure 2. Tenth Army military police force structure

In spite of the numerous significant characteristics of military police support in Operation Iceberg, there is no collective written history,

analysis of the details of support, or assessment of its value in the campaign. For this reason this historical thesis was undertaken.

Purpose

The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether military police support in Operation Iceberg was effective. Secondary questions include the following:

1. What criteria existed in 1945 to determine the effectiveness of military police operations?
2. Was the military police force structure employed in Operation Iceberg appropriate?
3. Were military police operations effective in Operation Iceberg?

Assumptions

The following assumptions are made in this thesis:

1. Military police support is a necessary component of combat support and combat service support.
2. Military police effectiveness can be assessed through evaluation of structure and operations.
3. Evaluation of structure and operations is possible through assessment of the planning and operations relating to each
4. Military police doctrine available in 1945 included all formal and informal materials documenting service experience and lessons learned.

5. Information provided in after action reports by units regarding the results of operations is factual and accurate.

6. Military police logistical support was adequate.

Definition of Terms

There are numerous terms and phrases in this document that require a clear definition. Only terms common in 1945 or those differing from current doctrinal meaning are included:

Administrative Order. An order covering administrative details, such as traffic, supply, and evacuation, when instructions are too voluminous to be included in paragraph 4 of the field order, and at other times when necessary to publish administrative instructions to the command; usually issued by divisions and higher units.¹²

Beach Maintenance Area. The beach maintenance area is that portion of the beachhead which contains all the combat service support units and activities necessary to sustain the landing force.¹³

Dump. A dump is the location within the beachhead where an individual unit's short term supply sustainment which travels in its organic trains is located.¹⁴

Enemy Civilians. Civilians found or encountered in a theater of war or in areas affected by operations other than war. They may include civilian internees, refugees, displaced civilians or detained civilians.¹⁵

Garrison/Island Commander. The garrison or island commander is the officer ordered to command the units of all services assigned as the garrison of an atoll, island, or other objective.¹⁶

Military Government. That form of government which is established and maintained by a belligerent by force of arms over occupied territory of the enemy and over the inhabitants thereof.¹⁷

Prisoner of War. A person captured or interned by a belligerent power because of war.¹⁸

Prisoner of War Collecting Point A locality designated in the area of a front-line division during combat for the assemblage of prisoners of war, pending examination and arrangement for further evacuation.¹⁹

Prisoner of War Inclosure An installation in the combat or communications zone with facilities for the processing and temporary detention of prisoners of war.²⁰

Straggler. A soldier who has become separated from his organization without authority. A motor vehicle that has fallen behind for any reason in an advance.²¹

Straggler Collecting Point. A straggler post designated as a collecting point in administrative orders at which stragglers are assembled pending return to their proper organizations. Straggler collecting points are located in straggler lines.²²

Straggler Line. A line designated as such in administrative orders and usually following well-defined terrain features such as roads, railroads, or streams along or in rear of which military police patrol for the purpose of apprehending soldiers absent from front-line units without authority.²³

Straggler Post. A post established by military police from which patrols operate for the purpose of apprehending stragglers.²⁴

Limitations

The problem conducting this research results from limited sources of information. Secondary sources which cover this campaign spend very few words addressing military police support directly. These sources do cover the topic indirectly when speaking of environmental factors: enemy prisoners, enemy civilians, or trafficability of main supply routes. This type of information is scattered through these texts requiring detailed and time consuming examination. Fortunately, the available primary source documentation provides much better detail regarding task organization, planned employment and results of operations. This information combined with the former may not provide a complete picture of the results of employment, problems, and lessons learned. Military police battalion after action reports exist for the units involved; however, information about separate units below the battalion level is contained within higher headquarters reports. Professional associations have rendered access to veterans of the 1st Military Police Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Numerous Marine Corps eyewitnesses were located and interviewed. No Army participants were located in spite of strenuous efforts. Even though difficulty existed in collecting desired evidence, this research design renders an accurate product with sufficient evidence to support this thesis.

Delimitation

This thesis will address the operations of other combat forces, combat support forces, and combat service support forces as required to

fully answer the primary and secondary questions regarding military police support.

Review of Literature

There are a number of excellent extant works which address the Okinawa Campaign. Key works on this topic are Major Charles S. Nichols, Jr., USMC, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr.'s *Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific*; James H. and William M. Belote's *Typhoon of Steel: The Battle for Okinawa*; Burton Beecher Briggs' *Logistic Support of the Okinawa Campaign*; George C. Dyer's *The Amphibians Came to Conquer War: The Story of Admiral Richard Kelly Turner*; Benis M. Frank's *Okinawa: Capstone to Victory*; I. T. M. Gow's *Okinawa, 1945: The Gateway to Japan*; Frank O. Hough's *The Island War*; Thomas M. Huber's *Japan's Battle for Okinawa*; and Irving Werstein's *Okinawa: The Last Ordeal*.

These accounts provide excellent historical information regarding the tactical and operational chronology of the Campaign. They spend little, if any, time addressing the military police support involved in the operation. There is some indirect reference through discussion of the environment. The attention devoted to enemy prisoners, circumstances on the beach, enemy civilians, military government, weather, and trafficability on Okinawa provides indirect reference to the operational environment of the military police.

Several other works serve to illustrate the personal attributes of this Campaign experienced by the individual Marine and Soldier. These books are George McMillan; C. Peter Zurlinden, Jr.; Alvin M. Josephy, Jr.; David Dempsey; Keyes Beech; and Herman Kogan's *Uncommon Valor: Marine*

Divisions in Action; William Manchester's *Goodbye, Darkness: A Memoir of the Pacific War*; and Ernie Pyle's *Last Chapter*. These texts make occasional reference to the military police directly and are also laced with much of the indirect notes described in the first category of literature.

Next, there are works dealing with specific unit history. These are found primarily at the Service and division level. These works include Benis M. Frank and Henry I. Shaw, Jr.'s *Victory and Occupation: History of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II*; Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens' *United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific, Okinawa: The Last Battle*; George McMillan's *The Old Breed: A History of the First Marine Division in World War II*; Richard W. Johnston's *Follow Me: The Story of the Second Marine Division of World War II*; James R. Stockman's *The Sixth Marine Division*; The Sixth Marine Division Association's *Sixth Marine Division: The Striking Sixth*; Edmund G. Love's *The Hourglass: A History of the 7th Infantry Division in World War II*; Edmund G. Love's *The 27th Infantry Division in World War II*; 77th Infantry Division, United States Army's *Ours to Hold it High: The History of the 77th Infantry Division in World War II*; and Orlando R. Davidson's *The Deadeyes: The Story of the 96th Infantry Division*. These works collectively provide very good unit histories considering the combat involvement at the division and regimental levels. These authors spend very little time and text addressing their organic military police support or attached military police support in a given operation. There is more direct reference available in these texts than found in other works about the Campaign. There is also additional

indirect reference made in these texts similar to that mentioned above. The history of the Second Marine Division provides a paragraph of commentary of its organic Military Police Company's handling of enemy prisoners during the Okinawa Campaign. The history of the 96th Infantry Division provides a two-page history of its organic Military Police Platoon's involvement in the Pacific. There are no references made about the companies of the 519th Military Police Battalion which were attached to the 7th, 77th, and 96th Infantry Divisions during the early phases of the Okinawa Campaign. Similarly, there are no references made to the companies of the 51st Military Police Battalion (Provisional) which were attached to the III Amphibious Corps, First Marine Division, and Sixth Marine Division during the early phases of the Okinawa Campaign.²⁵ Detailed examination of both of the foregoing categories of literature ensured discovery of small references to military police support spread throughout larger accounts.

Next, the most complete source of information exists in the primary source documentation: operation plans, administrative orders, field orders, daily staff reports, action reports, and special action reports from theater level down to battalions. Reports from units, even separate units below the battalion level were incorporated in the reports of the next higher level commands, if at all. This creates an obstacle in dealing with military police units due to the tendency to attach companies and platoons to divisions and regiments during certain phases of an operation. In these cases information availability depends upon the reporting priorities of the supported unit, since separate company and platoon reports through parent commands appear to have been rare.

Nevertheless, there is a considerable amount of information available in these documents for detailed review.

Finally, numerous relevant articles from periodicals such as the *Marine Corps Gazette* and *Military Review*, are available. These sources provide a range of information which is both directly and indirectly relevant. They contain historical discussions regarding military police support in several areas. Only one of these articles deals directly with the Okinawa Campaign; however, they serve to support doctrinal discussion and comparison. There is a great deal written about military government operations, civil affairs, and military police handling of enemy civilians. These articles serve to support discussion of military police handling of civilians.

Collation of the many small shreds of evidence available increased the ultimate value of this literature. No one source makes significant effort to address this topic; however, extraction of information from the many sources provided a more complete historical picture.

Significance of the Study

The significance of this study is twofold. First, this thesis fills a historical void in a military era which is otherwise well documented. While this thesis does not provide a comprehensive historical accounting of military police involvement in the Ryukyus campaign, it does represent the only collective work on this topic. Second, this thesis provides the only analysis of military police operations in World War II, and specifically the Pacific theater.

Endnotes

¹Dan, Van der Vat, *The Pacific Campaign: The U.S.-Japanese Naval War 1941-1945* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 382.

²Tenth Army, *Action Report Ryukyus, 26 March to 30 June 1945* (Okinawa: n.p., 3 Sep 45), 1-0-1.

³Robert G. Fix, *Tenth Army in the Okinawa Campaign: An Analysis from the Operational Perspective* (MMAS Thesis, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1992), 1-2.

⁴Tenth Army, *Action Report Ryukyus*, 1-0-2, 3-0-1, 3-0-2.

⁵Army Forces, Far East Command, General Headquarters, *The Provost Marshal's History, Campaigns of the Pacific, 1941-1947* (Australia: n.p., 23 Dec 47), 8, 30-33.

⁶1stLt Lewis Meyers, USMC, "Japanese Civilians in Combat Zones" *Marine Corps Gazette* (February 1945), 1-3.

⁷James H. and William M. Belote, *Typhoon of Steel: The Battle for Okinawa* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), 196-197.

⁸Tenth Army, *Action Report Ryukyus*, 11-XXII-1, 11-XXII-2.

⁹Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, *Participation in the Okinawa Operation*, ([?]: n.p., 15 Mar 46), 99.

¹⁰Tenth Army, *Action Report Ryukyus*, 11-XXII-1, 11-XXII-2.

¹¹LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC, (Ret), interview by author, 19 Oct 1994, tape recording and transcript, telephonic interview at LtGen Krulak's home in San Diego.

¹²FM 19-5, *Military Police [Obsolete]* (War Department: Government Printing Office, 14 Jun 44), 221.

¹³Tenth Army, 1st Engineer Special Brigade, *Operations Plan "Iceberg"* (Okinawa: n.p., 4 Feb 45), Annex No 1.

¹⁴Ibid., Annex No 1.

¹⁵Meyers, 1-3.

¹⁶Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, *Staff Officers' Field Manual for Amphibious Operations [Obsolete]* (Hawaii: n.p., 10 Sep 44), 55.

¹⁷FM 19-5, 223.

¹⁸Ibid., 223.

¹⁹Ibid., 223.

²⁰Ibid., 223, 224.

²¹Ibid., 225.

²²Ibid., 225.

²³Ibid., 225.

²⁴Ibid., 225.

²⁵Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens, *Okinawa: The Last Battle, The War in the Pacific, United States Army in World War II* (Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, DC), 1993, 473-482.

CHAPTER TWO

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

General Logic

The challenge in studying military police support in Operation Iceberg is measuring its effectiveness. In order to gauge military police effectiveness in this campaign, structural and operational evaluations are presented using a symmetrical framework (fig. 3).




Figure 3. Evaluation Framework

Within both major parts of this framework, two processes facilitate evaluation: assessment of planning and assessment of operations. Thus,

this chapter describes the framework for both evaluations and the mechanics of both processes within that framework. Finally, the military police doctrine and planning information available in 1945 is presented. While this chapter provides an overview of doctrine and information, detailed discussion by topic is found in chapters three and four.

Evaluation Framework

Structural and operational evaluations are combined to create one logical framework. This architecture forms the basis for chapters three and four: Military Police Structural Evaluation and Military Police Operational Evaluation. Within each chapter assessments of both planning and operations are used to facilitate evaluation. Additionally, efficiency is considered by grouping evidence according to major subordinate units, mission areas, and critical campaign junctures. Task organization and operational tempo is considered across this series of junctures. Relative economy of force and mutual support are highlighted in both evaluations.

In chapter three, force structure is evaluated to determine if it was appropriate. This evaluation of military police force structure seeks to answer the following question: Were sufficient personnel planned for, employed, and properly task organized to achieve operational success? In chapter four, military police operations are assessed to determine if effective in actual execution. Analysis of military police operations seeks to answer the following question: Given the available force structure, were military police operations effective and of value to the campaign?

This research design does not attempt to measure other areas, such as logistics, due to a lack of pertinent military police information. Logistical considerations having a significant impact on structure or operations are discussed under each topic.

Assessment of Planning

Each evaluation employs World War II contemporary doctrine and information regarding the operational setting available to planners as a gauge for assessment of preoperation military police planning. The goal of this assessment is to determine planning adequacy. Doctrinal standards and operational setting are compared to operation and administrative plans to provide conclusions about the appropriateness, completeness, and accuracy of military police force structure and operations planning.

Assessment of Operations

A second assessment process examines the appropriateness of the force structure employed and the effectiveness of the operations conducted based upon the results of military police operations. This operations-based assessment process differs from the operational evaluation. Whereas, the operational evaluation measures effectiveness, the operations-based assessment is merely one-of-two processes utilized to judge structural appropriateness as well as operational effectiveness. It combines information provided in special action reports, after action reports, literature, and interviews of participants to provide a historical picture of military police operations. Comparison of results with doctrinal criteria and precampaign planning creates a second gauge for assessing both military police structure and operations.

Doctrine

Four principal pieces of historical doctrine provide a basis for assessment of the accuracy of the military police force structure planning process. First, Field Manual 19-5, *Military Police*,¹ provided the primary source of Army military police doctrine through 1945. This field manual primarily addressed operational topics. There were, however, several sections dedicated to standard military police organizations and doctrinal support relationships with a field army, a corps, and a division. Operational information provided a basis for planning the capabilities and structure required to perform specific missions. Field Manual 19-5 included a separate section on military police support for amphibious operations.

Second, Fleet Marine Force, *Pacific Staff Officers' Field Manual for Amphibious Operations*,² provided detailed Marine Corps planning guidance for amphibious operations in the Pacific Ocean Area. This field manual contained a structural comparison of a Marine Division and an Army Infantry Division. Other information regarding military police supporting relationships with combat, and other combat support, and combat service support units was included. There was no specific military police operational information in this source, however, infrequent references are made regarding military police roles in amphibious operations.

Third, a series of training documents, published by Marine Corps Schools titled, *Amphibious Operations*, included *Amphibious (Phib) 19, Employment of Military Police*,³ This document provided the same level of doctrinal detail for operational topics as Field Manual 19-5, but emphasized Marine Corps amphibious operations. Whereas, Phib 19 was

published in 1945 and may not have been available to Operation Iceberg planners, it does represent the collective Marine Corps military police experience available to planners from after action reports of previous operations. It can reasonably be assumed to represent Marine Corps military police operational standards in January 1945.

Fourth, Field Manual 27-10, *Rules of Land Warfare*, provided very detailed and directive policy regarding the conduct of occupational forces, administration of military governments, and the treatment and handling of prisoners of war. This document represented very definitive policy for all personnel concerning these topics.⁴

Several periodicals exist which addressed military police lessons of this era. These articles focused primarily on three areas; amphibious operations, handling of civilians, and traffic operations. When combined with the four principal sources cited, the material provides a comprehensive base from which to derive historical standards. These standards provide a general gauge for assessment of military police structure and operations planning for this operation. Finally, the doctrine addressing force structure normally discussed types of units, but not their specific contents. Where necessary, U.S. Army and Marine Corps tables of organization will be referred to for details of unit structure and organization.

Structural Evaluation Criteria

The first major measure of military police effectiveness is the appropriateness of the military police force structure employed in this campaign.

The following questions arise:

1. Was the planned military police structure consistent with extant doctrinal standards and contemporary experience in the Pacific theater?
2. Was the military police structure which was employed adequate to handle the actual mission requirements?

The logic utilized to evaluate appropriateness of military police force structure employs the two assessments of planning and operations already discussed. Information is presented by major subordinate unit and is considered relative to the tactical and operational setting. Assessment of military police planning and operations as they relate to force structure provides a good ruler for measuring overall military police structural appropriateness for this campaign. Detailed discussion and evaluation is contained in chapter three.

Structural Planning Assessment

Examination of Tenth Army and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Area, military police structural planning provides a basis for assessment. This information is assessed for planner adherence to minimum standards established in doctrine. Did Tenth Army employ the minimum military police structure prescribed by doctrine?

Military police doctrine recommends traditional relationships between supporting and supported units based upon experience at the service level. While these traditional relationships fail to account for specific mission-based requirements, they do infer minimum generic levels of support at various command levels. Doctrine also provides a basis for deducing minimum requirements for the successful accomplishment of traditional

military police missions and functions. These requirements serve as a basis for calculating minimum force structure required for specific types of missions. While mission-based requirements fail to account for the general needs of supported units, the two methods used in tandem provide a complete means to assess the planned military police force structure.

Intelligence available to military police planners forecasted the probable operational setting. Numerous factors regarding the enemy, indigenous civilians, the environment, and the situation are considered due to their significant impact upon doctrinal considerations. Each factor is discussed in chapter three as it affects a particular facet of mission planning. Doctrinal criteria tempered with information provided the most accurate basis for planning military police support in 1945. Today this same process serves as a basis for assessment of the military police planning conducted.

Historical military police planning is reviewed and evaluated against the doctrinal criteria and operational setting to determine structural planning adequacy. U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, Tenth Army, and major subordinate command planning is assessed using this criteria.

Structural Operations-based Assessment

Operations-based assessment of the Tenth Army military police force structure considers specific units, specific operational results, and the relative tactical and operational setting in which military police operations occurred. This process seeks to assess the adequacy of military police structure based upon operational results. Did the Tenth Army have

sufficient military police assets to handle the circumstances they encountered? This question is answered by analysis of military police operations as they relate to structure. Assessment depends upon results from after action reports, special action reports, recollections of participants, or well-documented secondary source materials.

Major objectives expressed in planning are compared to the results of operations. Operation plans define the required structure that planners identified for this campaign. Operational results demonstrate whether planned structure was adequate with tangible evidence.

Evidence is organized by mission type or function, performing unit, and chronologically. Missions, functions, and performing units are self-explanatory. Chronological placement draws a relationship between the historical operation and one or more military police critical junctures in the campaign. There are five critical junctures for military police support in Operation Iceberg which are considered. First, there is the support to operations in the beach maintenance area.⁵ Second, there is the rapid sweep of northern Okinawa by 6th Marine Division.⁶ Third, there is the shifting of III Marine Amphibious Corps to southern Okinawa.⁷ Fourth, there is the period of constant monsoons and diminished trafficability in May and June, 1945.⁸ Finally, there is the massive expansion of prisoner and civilian internee populations as the southernmost part of Okinawa is secured.⁹ These five junctures are not consistent with campaign phases; however, they constitute periods of critical effort by military police units. Inefficiency is captured and separated from inadequate structure.

Operational Evaluation Criteria

The second major measure of military police overall effectiveness is operational effectiveness. The following questions logically arise:

1. Was operational planning consistent with extant doctrinal standards and experience in the Pacific theater?
2. Were planned military police missions successfully accomplished?

The logic and methodology used to determine effectiveness of military police operations employ the same assessments of planning and operations. The framework for evaluation is near-identical to that used for structure. Evidence is again organized by unit, function, and chronological sequence. As in the structural evaluation, the factors of economy of force and mutual support are discussed where applicable. A detailed discussion is contained in chapter four.

Operational Planning Assessment

The doctrinal criteria used in the structural evaluation is expanded upon in the operational evaluation. Was military police operational planning effective? This question is answered again by comparing doctrinal criteria and operational setting with the historical planning conducted.

Even though assessment of operations planning relies upon the same doctrinal sources, chapter four examines only operational content. It is specific enough to facilitate discussion of the key mission areas. The same five mission areas described in the structural evaluation are

considered here again. Each area is defined in sufficient detail to evaluate the effectiveness of both planning and operations conducted.

External factors and circumstances obviously affected each unit's ability to adhere to doctrinal standards. Thus, the setting is further defined from that base provided in chapter three. The expanded doctrinal criteria combined with a redefined setting together provide a yardstick to measure operational plans.

Planning is assessed for every unit possible; however, lack of information for some units precludes complete assessment. Thus, the assessment of planning in this operation focuses at the Tenth Army, XXIV Corps, and III Amphibious Corps levels due to availability of historical information. Unit planning at lower levels is incorporated into the Army and Corps discussions. The planning assessment reviews the planning product not the process.

Operational Results Assessment

Assessment of operational results represents the real substance of the historical discussion in this thesis. Were operations successful or unsuccessful? This question is answered by the historical facts surrounding the various military police operations. Operations discussed in chapter three considered structural inferences only, but chapter four analyzes all aspects of both successful and unsuccessful results achieved.

Plans identify operational objectives. These objectives indicate what capabilities were desired by planners. Military police plans, analyzed in the operational planning assessment, provide a basis for analysis of operations actually executed. Discussion of doctrinal criteria combined with the operational setting and planned operations

provides an overall operational criteria for each mission area. Comparison of historical operations with this criteria permits assessment of the quality of military police performance. Assessment of operations planning combined with assessment of actual operational results provides an accurate means to assess the overall effectiveness of military police operations.

Summary

The overarching logic and methodology of this thesis seeks to completely answer the primary and secondary questions spelled out in chapter one. This is accomplished through separate yet symmetrical evaluation of military police structure and military police operations. These two areas comprise the substance of the two following chapters. Within each chapter, planning and operations are discussed to achieve logical and factual answers to the research questions of this thesis.

Endnotes

¹FM 19-5, *Military Police [Obsolete]* (War Department, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 14 Jun 44), 1-250.

²Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, *Staff Officers' Field Manual for Amphibious Operations [Obsolete]* (Hawaii: n.p., 10 Sep 44), 1-74.

³PHIB 19, *Employment of Military Police [Obsolete]* (Marine Corps Schools, NC: n.p., 1945), Series on Amphibious Operations, 33 vols, 1-48.

⁴FM 27-10, *Rules of Land Warfare [Obsolete]* (War Department, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1940), 18-21, 74-77, 82-85.

⁵Tenth Army, *Action Report Ryukyus, 26 March to 30 June 1945*, 3 vols. (Okinawa: n.p., 3 Sep 45), P7-III-2, PII-IV-8/29, PII-XXII-1/5; Provost Marshal, 1st Engineer Special Brigade, *Military Police Activities Okinawa Beach Service Area* (Okinawa: n.p., 17 July 1945), 1-3

⁶6th Marine Division, *Special Action Report, Okinawa Operation, 2 vols., Phases I & II, 30 Apr 45, Phase III* (Okinawa: n.p., 30 Jun 45), VII-11/48.

⁷III Marine Amphibious Corps, *Action Report Ryukyus Operation, Phases I and II* (Okinawa: n.p., 1 Jul 45), 44.

⁸XXIV Corps, *Action Report Ryukyus, 1 Apr-30 Jun 45* (Okinawa: n.p., n.d.), 67-69, 87-90; III Marine Amphibious Corps, *Action Report*, 110-128.

⁹Tenth Army, *Action Report*, P7-III-33/35.

CHAPTER THREE

MILITARY POLICE FORCE STRUCTURE EVALUATION

General

World War II era military police operations depended heavily on manpower and human interaction to achieve success. Therefore, adequate force structure, effective task organization, and economy of force were crucial principles guiding the military police planning process. As described in chapter two, assessments of planning and operations are combined to evaluate structure, but doctrinal criteria must first be identified.

Structural Planning Assessment

Doctrinal Support Relationships

Doctrine affected force structure in two ways. First, doctrine established traditional support relationships for military police units and supported commands. Second, doctrine created specific conditions for mission performance based upon service level experience and lessons learned. These conditions served to expand or diminish traditional levels of prescribed support tailoring it for a given situation. Traditional support relationships therefore required first consideration. One question arises here. Does the planned military police force structure provide minimum doctrinal support prescribed in traditional support relationships?

Field Manual (FM) 19-5, *Military Police*, provided planners with a general description of the doctrinal levels of military police support for a U.S. Army division, corps, field army, and theater headquarters. Specific organization of these units was found in their respective tables of organization or tables of organization and equipment. Additionally, this reference provided description of military police prisoner of war processing companies, military police escort guard companies, and specially formed criminal investigation units for use at critical points within a theater. Finally, FM 19-5 describes a military police company, aviation for use in support of air forces and associated installations.¹

U.S. Army Ground Combat Forces

The division military police platoon, organic to all types of divisions, was manned in accordance with Tables of Organization 19-87 and 19-97, or Tables of Organization and Equipment 19-7, 19-117, and 19-177T. It is important to note that the term platoon here must be properly defined. A division military police platoon organized under Table of Organization 19-7 was authorized approximately 90 soldiers in the unit. By comparison, Army military police companies were authorized between 130 and 150 soldiers depending upon the table of organization that the unit was organized under. Found within the division headquarters company, division military police platoons were commanded by the division provost marshal.²

The Army corps was doctrinally assigned a military police platoon organized under Table of Organization and Equipment 19-77. The corps provost marshal supervised this platoon. When the Corps operated as part of a field army, doctrine considered one platoon adequate. In situations where the corps was operating independently or required additional support,

doctrine provided for the assignment of a military police company, organized under Table of Organization and Equipment 19-37. This elastic company expanded with additional platoons to provide a minimum of one platoon per division. The 19-37 company had the same support relationship with a corps as a military police battalion had with a field army.

The field army military police battalion doctrinally provided a wide range of support within the army area of operation. It operated within both the combat zone and the communication zone. This battalion was organized under Table of Organization and Equipment 19-35. This battalion consisted of a headquarters and headquarters detachment, four military police companies, and a medical detachment. Each company within the battalion consisted of company headquarters, scout car section, and three military police platoons. For an army of more than three corps, a military police company, Table of Organization and Equipment 19-37, attached to the battalion for each additional corps.³

The task organization for Tenth Army reflects that each Army division had an assigned military police platoon, the XXIV Corps had an assigned military police platoon, and the 519th Military Police Battalion. Assigning the 519th Military Police Battalion to the XXIV Corps vice Tenth Army, deviated from doctrinal support relationships in FM 19-5 to push military police support forward to XXIV Corps. The Tenth Army Headquarters had a platoon from the 519th Military Police Battalion providing security and military police support at the command post. Additionally, the Corps attached companies from the 519th to their two assault divisions, 7th Infantry Division and 96th Infantry Division. Company B, 724th Military Police Battalion attached to the 77th Infantry Division in Tenth Army

reserve.⁴ The Tenth Army deviated from basic Army doctrinal support relationships, however, the total quantity of Army military police units compared to the total number of Army supported commands clearly satisfies the basic quantitative support requirement for a field army established in doctrine. Tenth Army did not maintain centralized control of the 519th Military Police Battalion in order to provide additional support to XXIV Corps for shore party operations. Maximum military police support was task organized at the lowest possible levels.

U.S. Marine Corps Ground Combat Forces

The Marine Corps Schools produced a series of training documents titled *Amphibious Operations* (Phib). Document number 19 in this series, Phib 19, was titled *Employment of Military Police*. Phib 19 provided planners with the same service level experience and traditional support relationships as FM 19-5. Phib 19 provided a description of two basic Marine Corps military police organizations; the Fleet Marine Force military police battalion and the Marine division military police company.⁵

The military police company organic to the Marine division possessed three platoons and a company headquarters. Table of Organization F-90 provided the structure and organization of this company. An F Series company rated approximately 100 Marines.⁶ The military police company provided a full range of support to the Marine division. The company commander also acted as the division provost marshal. Doctrinal provision existed for a division to request additional military police support from the next higher echelon of command when necessary.⁷

Fleet Marine Force military police battalions, new organizations at the end of 1944, possessed four military police companies and a

headquarters and service company. The first of these military police battalions was activated 27 October 1944. These new battalions saw varying manning levels between 350 to 500 Marines. Doctrinally, one or more of these battalions was task organized into a force above the division level⁸.

The Marine ground combat forces of Tenth Army belonged to the III Marine Amphibious Corps. The Corps' task organization included a corps military police company and a company in each of its two principal assault divisions: 1st and 6th Marine Divisions. The 1st Military Police Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific also attached to and supported the III Marine Amphibious Corps. Additionally, the Tenth Army attached three military police companies from the 1st Provisional Military Police Battalion, Island Command to this corps. The III Marine Amphibious Corps kept one of these companies attached to the Corps Military Government Section, and attached the other two companies to the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions. Tenth Army planned this joint attachment of military police to assist III Marine Amphibious Corps with control of civilians and allow more military police units to flow into the target in assault shipping. The 7th Field Depot possessed a guard company. Although not organized under a military police table of organization, this company performed numerous military police support functions. Finally, the 2d Marine Division also in Tenth Army reserve had a company of military police organized under Table of Organization F-90.⁹

It is obvious that Marine Corps doctrine in PHIB 19 failed to address two of the military police organizations employed to support an Amphibious Corps: the corps military police company and the field depot guard company. In spite of this, the planned Marine military police force

structure exceeded doctrinal standards. The three attached Army military police companies gave the corps an approximate 30% increase to its military police structure. Ultimately, III Marine Amphibious Corps possessed over 60% more military police support than prescribed by doctrine.

Landing Operations

Prior to leaving the discussion of support to ground combat units, it is important to mention the specific nuances involved with amphibious operations of this time frame. In the landing phase of this amphibious operation, organic military police support from the divisions decentralized and attached to the regimental combat teams. In some cases this support further subdivided attaching to the battalion landing teams. This process provided early presence of military police support to the shore party. As the next higher headquarters flowed ashore and established control, these units normally consolidated again either remaining on the beach or pushing forward with the division. These units required no additional structure to provide this shore party support. Division military police companies simply detached platoons and platoons detached squads to shift structure. Corps' and Army level shore parties drew military police support from organic and attached assets.¹⁰

Garrison Forces/Island Command

FM 19-5 prescribed a second type of military police battalion to assist in maintaining security at the service command, defense command, ports of embarkation, overseas department, or within a theater of operations. This type of unit, organized under Table of Organization and Equipment 19-55 or 19-56, possessed four military police companies, a

headquarters and headquarters detachment, and a medical detachment. Capable of performing a full range of military police functions, it represented a versatile organization well suited for support to garrison forces and island commands. However, available doctrinal publications failed to specifically address a support relationship for this type of battalion with a specific size U.S. Army garrison force or island command. For that reason, garrison force planning relied almost exclusively on estimated mission requirements. It is noted here that two provisional military police battalions were formed from the 102d Infantry Regiment under Table of Organization 19-55. The 1st Provisional Military Police battalion attached to the Island Troops, Island Command, and the 2d Provisional Military Police battalion attached to the Military Government, Island Command. The Army redesignated these two battalions prior to campaign closure as the 51st and 52d Military Police battalions respectively.¹¹

In addition to military police battalions, FM 19-5 loosely described criminal investigation units. These were special organizations formed within a theater of operations to conduct criminal investigations for a field army, within a communications zone, or other commands which required this type support. Here again, doctrine failed to establish a quantitative support relationship. It also fails to establish the general size of these units. U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Area and Tenth Army Provost Marshals identified a requirement for two criminal investigation sections, organized under Table of Organization 19-500BJ. Subsequently, only one became available: the 36th Criminal Investigation Detachment with approximately eleven members.¹²

A third area of support to a garrison force where no exact support relationship existed concerned prisoner of war processing companies. These small special units operated at the platoon level in the Pacific. They provided administration and record keeping functions for the Prisoner of War Information Bureau. Table of Organization and Equipment 19-237 outlined structure for these companies; however, their independent platoons had an organic administrative capability and operated independent of the company. The 1st Platoon, 162d Military Police Prisoner of War Processing Company attached to the 1st Military Police Battalion, Island Troops, Island Command. The successful experience of these units in the Pacific, forecasted the adequacy of this planned structure.¹³

FM 19-5 identified one organization that had a prescribed support relationship with garrison forces; the military police escort guard company. Organized under Table of Organization 19-47, this company attached to the higher headquarters for a theater of operations, a service command, a defense command, a field army, or a separate corps. This company operated a prisoner of war inclosure, or a camp, and conducted evacuation of prisoners. The Tenth Army did not request any of these companies for operation of the Island Command central prisoner of war inclosure. Historical records provide no evidence of why this type organization failed to participate in the campaign.¹⁴

Tactical Air Forces

Planning for support of tactical air forces and installations presented issues similar to those faced in planning for military police support for garrison forces. Development of airfields on Okinawa

projected a commensurate increase in the military police support for these installations. The base development plan depicted a total of eighteen airfields. FM 19-5 prescribed use of a military police company, aviation for airfield support. It provided traffic control and security with five operating sections and a company headquarters according to Table of Organization 19-217. This organization expanded as necessary to meet the needs of a particular air base. The traditional support relationship assigned one company per base. The Tenth Army Tactical Air Force possessed the 1243d Military Police Company, Aviation and the 1388th Military Police Company, Aviation within the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, 92d Air Depot Group. The plan to utilize only two military police companies, aviation failed to recognize minimum doctrinal support relationships for the support of eighteen airfields. Additionally, the two principal airfields of Yontan and Kadena continually drew on the 1st Provisional Military Police Battalion and the 1st Military Police Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific for additional support. Military police records fail to explain this planning deficiency. Due to exhausted theater sources of replacements and service units, the Provost Marshal, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Area received disapproval of a request for a fifth military police battalion. This may account indirectly for this and other structural shortfalls.¹⁵

Functional Doctrine and Setting

Functional doctrine merely prescribed the characteristics of proper performance of a particular mission or function. This combined with relevant intelligence allowed planners to predict the environment and its

impact on structure. The same military police doctrine used to determine support relationships applied here also. Functional areas included traffic control operations, prisoner of war operations, enemy civilian control operations, security operations, and law and order operations. These functional areas are analyzed and compared to the structure and capabilities of the various military police units.

Traffic Control Operations

Army doctrine in FM 19-5 and Marine Corps Doctrine in PHIB 19 both placed a large premium on the importance of traffic control, avoidance of congestion, and mobility for combat effectiveness and operational success. Doctrinal responsibility for traffic planning resided with the G-4. Doctrinal responsibility for road reconnaissance, input to the G-4, and route signing fell upon the engineers. Doctrinal responsibility for execution of traffic plans resided with the military police under the supervision of the provost marshal.¹⁶ Specific prescribed duties fall into two areas which impact upon required structure.

1. Operate control points at bottlenecks, intersections, and one-way defiles; and operate information booths, furnish information, report movements, report required maintenance, and recommend improvements.

(Required fixed posts)

2. Escort columns, patrol routes, handle accidents, and clear jams. (Required foot and vehicle patrols)¹⁷

Intelligence available for the target environment provided fairly detailed information on beaches, inland terrain, and road networks. The Hagushi beaches backed up to a seawall and other obstacles, but, each assault beach had numerous exits leading toward a coastal road running

between the beach and Kadena and Yontan airfields. The central part of the island possessed a complex inland road network. Okinawan roads continued south via three principle routes. Substantial lateral routes existed around major towns and villages, however, decreased in the open expanses in between. To the north, only one principle route ran north and south. Occasionally, lateral access roads ran between the primary route and local towns or villages. Undeveloped and restrictive routes characterized the road network in the north. Approximately 225 and 450 miles of primary and secondary roads respectively would require a complex system of traffic control posts and patrols. This is depicted in Figure 4. The most significant deficiency of the Okinawa road network centered on the poor quality of surface and subsurface road materials. Considering the anticipated volume of military traffic and poor weather, roads promised to deteriorate quickly requiring traffic control in areas requiring maintenance. Together, these factors indicated that traffic control would require a much greater than normal focus of manpower.¹⁸

The Provost Marshal, U.S. Army Forces Pacific Ocean Area analyzed traffic operations of previous theater campaigns in detail to produce force requirements. Subsequently, the Tenth Army Provost Marshal's plans called for and requested an additional military police battalion which was disapproved. There is no evidence that corps or division provost marshals anticipated difficulty accomplishing this mission with the available support. Military police planning at the army and theater levels reflected thorough analysis; however, subordinate military police units relied upon G-4 sections for production of traffic plans necessary to calculate traffic post and patrol requirements. The timeliness of traffic planning

varied among the numerous G-4 sections. Not all major subordinate commands produced traffic circulation plans prior to landing. This deprived military police units of the ability to plan traffic related force requirements in detail.¹⁹

Prisoner of War Operations

Doctrine in both FM 19-5 and Phib 19 maintained consistent policy for military police handling of prisoners of war. Clear reference also existed to Field Manual (FM) 27-10, *Rules of Land Warfare*.²⁰ The primary goal of doctrine sought compliance with the provisions of FM 27-10 in handling prisoners at all levels. There existed three sub-functions of these operations which directly affected military police force structure requirements:

1. Operation of division collecting points. (Division level military police operated)
2. Evacuation of prisoners from division collecting points to prisoner of war inclosures in rear areas. (Corps/army level military police evacuated)
3. Operation of prisoner of war inclosures. (Operated by corps/army level military police/military police escort guard company)²¹

Each of the functions listed above have a varying impact on structure depending upon the number of enemy prisoners involved and the duration of the operation. In order to be useful, this doctrinal information required an estimate of enemy prisoners of war that would be captured. The Tenth Army intelligence estimate in the Tentative Operations Plan, Iceberg provided no information or estimate of enemy prisoners that




Figure 4. South and Central Okinawa Road Network

would probably be captured during the campaign. Both Tenth Army and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas action reports omit this issue in discussions of planning and intelligence. However, the Provost Marshal, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas states that the enemy prisoner of war operations in the Philippines and other small island campaigns were studied in planning for Operation Iceberg. These records further indicate that large numbers of prisoners were anticipated in planning. Plans placed responsibility for prisoner of war operations with military police units organic to combat units and considered this structure adequate. Corps military police units were initially tasked with establishment and operation of inclosures. Operation plans provided detailed and consistent guidance for handling of prisoners of war. In short, the traditional support relationships were viewed as adequate. Finally, the military police battalion assigned to garrison forces was tasked to run a central prisoner of war inclosure later in the campaign. The prisoner of war plans were consistent with doctrine, exploited the additional military police support at the corps level, and ultimately shifted the burden to garrison forces.²²

Civilian Handling Operations

Both Army and Marine Corps doctrine pointed out the relationship between military police in occupied territory and the administration of military government. FM 27-10, *Rules of Land Warfare*, was at the heart of military police operations in support of military government. The basic goals for this mission area included enforcement of military government ordinances, protection of lives and property, and restoration of law and order. Specific duties prescribed fell into two areas affecting structure:

1. Security functions; escort and guard internees, defend civilian inclosures and rear areas from isolated resistance, guerrillas, and hostile attacks, and seize and secure civil records, property, and facilities.

2. Law and order functions; prevent pillage and pilferage, conduct energetic preventive policing, and administer jails or prisons.²³

Doctrinal information considered military occupation in general terms, and presented complex problems to military police planners. Counterintelligence planners assessed the probable reaction of these civilians to Tenth Army forces. Japanese propaganda would probably result in fear and possible hostility until U.S. intentions were demonstrated. Thus, the Tenth Army concept initially treated each enemy civilian on Okinawa as a prisoner of war until properly classified. Although segregated from actual prisoners of war, each civilian would require all of the same handling considerations. This added a second requirement to perform all the same duties necessary for prisoners of war. Civilian functions could not be consolidated with prisoner of war handling since the two groups had to be segregated: separate collecting points, separate inclosures, and separate evacuation processes. At a minimum, this would require duplication of the military police support to combat units considered adequate for handling prisoners of war.²⁴

This mission area also required an estimate of the number of civilians that would be interned in order to judge the impact on structure. In this case, military government planners prepared a detailed estimate of civilians to be interned, respective geographic locations, and relative time in the campaign. The plan envisioned a symmetrical uncovering of the

civilian population in the north and south. The total population anticipated counted approximately three hundred thousand Okinawans.²⁵

Military government teams were attached to combat units at the lowest levels; however, the 2d Provisional Military Police Battalion attached to the Military Government Section, Island Command was not scheduled to arrive at the target until seventeen days after the initial landing. Three companies from the 1st Provisional Military Police Battalion were attached to the III Marine Amphibious Corps: Company A attached to the Military Government Section, III Marine Amphibious Corps, and Companies B and C attached to the, 1st and 6th Marine Divisions to work with military government teams. This joint task organization planned to cover the shortfall created by the shipping flow of the garrison forces, and moved more military police support forward to handle civilians.²⁶ This mission area demanded augmentation of military police structure based upon the density of the civilian population on Okinawa. Planners accommodated this need through shifts in task organization. Each corps had a military police battalion attached, and the III Marine Amphibious Corps had garrison force military police companies attached. Additionally, the remainder of the 1st Provisional Military Police Battalion planned to land and attach to the 1st Engineer Special Brigade/Tenth Army Shore Party Group. Tenth Army planners shifted three battalions of army level and garrison force military police support to combat units early in the campaign. The plan later shifted garrison force units back under Island Command. Thorough planning by military government sections allowed military police planners to be flexible in the employment of a limited structure.²⁷

Security Operations

Security operations doctrinally overlapped the four other mission areas. In traffic operations, military police secured main supply routes, key road junctions, and bridges. In prisoner of war operations, military police secured collecting points, inclosures, and prisoners in transit. In civilian control operations, military police secured civil records, populations, and facilities. Military police also conducted tactical security operations in rear areas against enemy small units or guerrillas. As will be shown in law and order operations, security is inherent in the act of policing. These functions generally do not affect structural planning, as most are subset activities of another mission area. As such, they require no additional personnel. However, security of critical facilities such as supply dumps, airfields, command posts, or construction units generally required dedicated forces with this as their primary focus. In these cases, military police forces required structuring to accommodate these planned missions.²⁸

FM 19-5 and Phib 19 described all the duties listed above. Additionally, these references provided guidance concerning shore party security concerns. Security of supply dumps constituted a major consideration in the normal confusion that characterized the beach service area during an amphibious landing. Security of supplies precluded pilferage and protected them against enemy units and civilians. Intelligence estimates described counterlandings and employment of paratroops within the beachhead as likely enemy courses of action. This potential threat required that structural plans account for it. Military police detachments from division assets attached to the first subordinate

shore parties to land, and company size detachments from corps' military police units ultimately supported the Army Shore Party Group.²⁹

Next, consideration of airfield security requirements was a critical planning factor. The size of Kadena and Yontan airfields and the prospect of developing sixteen additional airfields created a major structural consideration. Doctrine asserted that military police companies, aviation provided a proper support relationship for a single tactical air forces installation. However, no information on security requirements for either of these airfields or any of the planned airfields was present in the historical records available. Additionally, this organization provided expandable structure, but no information on actual size or structure was addressed in the documents examined. The 1243d Military Police Company, Aviation and the 1388th Military Police Company, Aviation both existed under Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, 92d Air Depot Group. These two units are mentioned in the action report of the Provost Marshal, Tenth Army, but only briefly. It is unclear why additional aviation companies were not planned to support the two other existing airfields or the fourteen planned airfields. Plans fail address any of these additional requirements.³⁰

Law and Order Operations

Doctrine from FM 19-5 and Phib 19 specified law and order operations encompassed within the scope of traffic control operations, prisoner of war operations, and civilian control operations. These functions, such as traffic enforcement or enforcement of civil populations, were components of the larger mission areas. These redundant functions

required no additional structure beyond that required for the principal mission area.³¹

Two other independent functions of law and order operations prescribed by doctrine existed in plans. The most significant function involved control of stragglers. Stragglers consisted of unauthorized personnel in a given zone of action. These stragglers routinely included souvenir hunters or curiosity seekers. Their movement from rear areas and presence in forward areas clogged main supply routes and interfered with combat forces. Doctrine prescribed establishment of straggler lines, points, and patrols as control measures. These requirements sometimes coincided with other traffic, prisoner of war, civilian control, or security posts; however, this was not always the case. Given its relative priority by Tenth Army, this function required consideration in forming structure. Straggler controls were normally instituted immediately to the rear of division boundaries placing principal responsibility with the corps military police. The scope of this problem typically grew as service and garrison forces flowed ashore later in the campaign. However, as shown earlier, the corps military police assets became less engaged with prisoners and civilians as garrison forces became operational. The result was that corps military police battalions planned to shift emphasis from other mission areas to this one.³²

Another independent function of law and order operations concerned general enforcement. First, military police attempted to prevent pilferage, promiscuous firing of weapons, unauthorized possession of souvenirs or contraband, and desecration of tombs. Violations were investigated, incidents reported, and restraint applied when necessary.

The Island Command operated a U.S. prisoner central stockade. At lower levels, temporary stockades were operated as necessary. Plans placed the responsibility for law and order operations with military police units at each level due to anticipated infrequency of violations.³³

Operations-based Assessment of Structure

Traffic Control Operations

Traffic operations planned in the beachhead employed doctrinal relationships of military police units attached to shore party elements as described in the planning assessment. At division and lower levels operations were executed in accordance with plans. As the corps' shore parties landed, corps military police units were planned for support of these organizations. XXIV Corps assumed control of the southern half of the Hagushi beaches on L+2 and III Marine Amphibious Corps assumed control of the northern half on L+6. 1st Platoon, Company A and 1st Platoon Company B, 519th Military Police Battalion detached from their parent companies supporting the 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions. They remained on the beach as planned to support the XXIV Corps Shore Party. Companies C and D of the 1st Military Police Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific were planned to support the III Marine Amphibious Corps Shore Party. These units, originally, scheduled to land on L+3, did not come ashore until L+11 leaving the corps shore party without support for five days.³⁴ During this period the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions left guides behind in critical intersections to protect their lines of communication to the beach.

The Tenth Army Shore Party Group assumed control of the beachhead on 9 April 1945.³⁵ Tenth Army Shore Party Group or 1st Engineer Special Brigade relied upon military police elements of both corps' shore parties.

Company D of 1st Provisional Military Police Battalion was planned to attach to the brigade for additional support. Scheduled to land on L+5, this unit did not arrive until L+16. Corps' military police responsibilities were divided north and south at yellow beach 3 at the mouth of the Bisha Gawa. The northern beaches were largely abandoned after 1 May 1945.³⁶

The Tenth Army Provost Marshal reported division military police on duty on the beaches and main roads on L+1 in accordance with plans. The 6th Marine Division assessed their military police organization for shore party support as adequate and efficient. Both corps reported no congestion on their beaches; however, III Marine Amphibious Corps noted that the shore party military police landed too late to perform efficiently, and some beaches used to land Tenth Army service units had inadequate traffic control.³⁷

As initial inland traffic control operations in central Okinawa progressed, military police assisted engineers posting signs. This additional duty diverted personnel planned for use at traffic posts. The engineers recommended greater numbers of military police to keep main supply routes open. As operations in the north progressed rapidly and more roads uncovered, traffic control was hampered. Due to the number of military police required to handle civilians, guard supply dumps, and still afloat, insufficient military police were available for traffic control posts. The initial traffic problems were corrected as more units such as the 1st Military Police Battalion flowed ashore and established traffic posts as planned. The 6th Marine Division Engineer reported that engineers

handled traffic control at construction sites until military police became available.³⁸

At the end of April 1945 the III Marine Amphibious Corps executed two separate division moves south into the Tenth Army lines. Additionally, the 27th Infantry Division moved to the north to assume tactical responsibility for that area.³⁹ All of these division moves succeeded without any difficulty. This provided evidence of adequate military police structure when division and corps units supported each other.⁴⁰

Traffic control became critical during the monsoons between late May and early June. U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, Observer reports indicated that there was a need for more properly trained military police, especially in these later phases. It further inferred that inadequate military police structure compounded the problems in the XXIV Corps zone created by weather. Subsequent to the loss of supply routes 13 and 5, the structure supported twenty-four-hour-a-day operations between L+51 and L+65. However, XXIV Corps military police assisted III Marine Amphibious Corps military police with control of XXIV Corps traffic on route 1 while route 13 was closed.⁴¹

Traffic control operations supporting Tenth Army, as it uncovered the southern end of Okinawa and encountered dense pockets of remaining civilians, were characterized at all echelons as excellent. Many traffic posts south of the Island Command forward boundary were jointly manned. The III Marine Amphibious Corps characterized these operations as requiring strenuous effort from available units.⁴²

Traffic control in the outlying island operations is evidenced by operations of 3d Platoon, 2d Marine Division Military Police Company on

Iheya Shima and Aguni Shima. This platoon's support for shore party required augmentation by Marines of a thirty five man replacement draft. The S-4 indicated that the doctrinal compliment of military police was insufficient for handling both traffic operations and civilian handling operations simultaneously.⁴³

In summary, the results of traffic control operations provided mixed reviews on the supporting structure. First, it is difficult to draw exact discriminating lines between problems created by late arriving units and insufficient structure. Division level support was generally viewed as adequate except within the separate regimental landing force employed on Iheya Shima. However, division operations received supplementary support from corps military police units. Operations at corps or army levels sometimes indicated a need for additional structure. This resulted primarily from the late arrival of corps, army, and garrison military police units, and was corrected as these units became available. Garrison forces provided minimal augmentation to combat units in this mission area; however, the two corps ultimately supported each other late in the campaign. Finally, the simultaneous requirement to accomplish other missions was a significant distraction from traffic operations throughout the campaign.

Prisoner of War Operations

Planned prisoner of war operations simply included collection, escorting, holding, and processing of Japanese military prisoners and other labor troops. Complexity entered into this mission area only as responsibility for various tasks was assigned to a particular level of

military police support. As noted earlier in this chapter, planners assumed that military police structure assigned to combat units would be adequate to accomplish this function. Additionally, garrison forces were tasked to take over operation of corps inclosures and conduct permanent processing of prisoners. They were unable to accomplish this and had to opt for a single central inclosure.⁴⁴

Historical records reflect that the internment and processing of over 10,000 prisoners was accomplished without significant difficulty. Planned temporary inclosures were operated by both corps until the Island Command temporary central inclosure was opened on 17 April 1945. Garrison forces also proved inadequate to run the central inclosure at several points during the campaign. The 1st Platoon, 162d Military Police Company, Prisoner of War Processing, had to provide or augment security during these periods. In spite of this, the unit proved adequate for the task of processing 10,000 prisoners over the allotted period. The clear inference from review of these operations points to the adequacy of the military police structure within combat forces as well as the inadequacy of military police structure within garrison forces.⁴⁵

Civilian Handling Operations

Civilian handling operations ran parallel to prisoner of war operations, but were thirty times the size and scope of the latter. This mission area represented the most significant challenge of the campaign for military police. Planners, as already noted in this chapter, provided a dedicated military police structure intended to integrate into the Military Government Section of the Island Command. The 2d Provisional Military Police Battalion ultimately provided this support; however, the unit landed

in three principal echelons on L+17, L+25, and L+37. This scheduled flow into the target rendered this battalion unavailable until phase three of the campaign causing other units to compensate in the interim period. Whereas, military police units assigned to combat forces planned to collect and escort civilians, garrison forces were expected to hold civilians, administer to twenty three planned camps, and provide a full range of support to the military government teams.¹⁶

In order to reinforce available military police units early in the operation, Companies A, B, and C of the 1st Provisional Military Police Battalion attached to the III Marine Amphibious Corps and landed on L day through L+2. These units dedicated their efforts exclusively to this mission area. The 1st Military Police Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific as already mentioned landed eight days late. This factor also deprived the III Marine Amphibious Corps of planned support for this function during this initial phase.

Civilian inclosures established by military government teams in the beach service area were initially unguarded due to insufficient military police once divisions moved forward. Lack of interpreters again hampered military police support. Selected observer reports recommended that military police tables of organization be expanded to include interpreters in each company and battalion headquarters.¹⁷

Combat forces were required to conduct civilian handling operations beyond mere collection at least twice during the campaign. A shortage of military police burdened the combat forces of 6th Marine Division with civilians in northern Okinawa between L+20 and L+30. This issue impacted 6th Marine Division tactical operations significantly. As a

result, the decision was made to decline civilian operations where a potential adverse result to tactical operations might occur. This problem occurred again for 6th Marine Division late in the campaign in southern Okinawa. However, this time the 15th Marines formed a provisional military police unit of two officers and seventy five enlisted Marines to handle civilians. In both cases, the available military police structure proved inadequate to accomplish planned missions.⁴⁸

The problems handling civilians resulted from three basic factors. First, the late arrival of combat support and garrison forces limited ability to cope with initial numbers of civilians. Second, the return of all three companies of the 1st Provisional Military Police Battalion to Island Command control while 6th Marine Division was quickly uncovering large numbers of civilians, put this division at immediate disadvantage. Third, the density of civilians uncovered in final stages of the campaign combined with lengthy evacuation routes to camps in the rear, stressed the military police structure. This occurred at a time when military police were providing a full range of services across the entire island. No other operational examples indicating insufficient military police structure existed. All other planned civilian operations were accomplished, and a total of 284,669 civilians were successfully interned.⁴⁹

Security Operations

Security of supply dumps, airfields, command posts, or other critical sites represented four areas which required independent military police structure. Little evidence of advance detailed planning or

enumeration of sites left only general guidance addressing the types of service or rear area activities requiring protection. Supply dump security was the responsibility of the respective shore party commander; however, airfields, command posts, or other sites received no attention in plans.

Plans included supply dump security provisions and strict prohibition of pilfering. The absence of sufficient military police initially in the beach service area resulted in considerable looting and pilferage of equipment and supplies. As additional units landed this problem came under control. The equipment of the 1st Military Police Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific landed on yellow beach three ahead of the Battalion. When the unit came ashore on L+11, virtually all of it was gone. It took approximately five days for the battalion to recover the majority of its vehicles, and by six days for the quartermaster to replace essential supplies.⁵⁰

Plans failed to address security for airfields. Very little information exists regarding the actual security of Kadena or Yontan airfields. The 1st Provisional Military Police Battalion, the 1st Military Police Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and the 519th Military Police Battalion all augmented security at one or both of these airfields on numerous occasions during the campaign. In the absence of specific plans, these additional missions pulled planned structure from other mission areas.⁵¹

Plans also failed to address security of command posts. Doctrine prescribed military police support for the field army command post; however, this support was oriented around personnel protection of the commanding general. This function was not prescribed for corps and

division units. The 519th Military Police Battalion provided a platoon to the Tenth Army Command Post. This platoon provided security for the headquarters and assisted the provost marshal operating a special G-2 interrogation area. The Commanding General, Island Command also employed a large twenty man personal security detail. Company D, 1st Provisional Military Police Battalion provided this detail. Finally, some division units also used military police for security of the division command post. Here again, unplanned missions pulled structure away from other potential employment.

Finally, miscellaneous security requirements such as protection of navy construction battalion sites and equipment drew upon military police structure. These miscellaneous security tasks were not planned. The 1st Military Police Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, provided this type of support during phase three of the campaign. This security was not incident to another principal mission area such as traffic operations. Military police focused on security of assets at night when inoperable.

Planned and unplanned security operations constituted the largest impediment to structural adequacy for other mission areas. Improperly considered, these requirements lacked sufficient dedicated structure to ensure successful mission accomplishment and non-interference with other mission areas.

Law and Order Operations

Straggler control topped the list of duties in this mission area. This responsibility rested primarily with the corps military police units, however, all levels of command bore a responsibility for enforcement. The Tenth Army Provost Marshal reported this as the greatest enforcement

problem, but approximately seven hundred and ninety stragglers were apprehended in the beach maintenance area alone between L+8 and L+60. Conversely, the 519th Military Police Battalion apprehended only Fifty four stragglers in the XXIV Corps zone of action between L day and L+84. These operations achieved planned results without significant difficulties indicating adequate supporting structure.⁵³

General enforcement and prevention of pilferage required the second greatest amount of military police effort. Few arrests were made, but much of the missing material was recovered by military police. Here, military police structure provided adequate support for a planned and valuable service. Enforcement of weapons discipline in rear areas and prevention of desecration of tombs were the subject of limited historical discussion in unit reports. It is clear that these missions were planned for and conducted indicating that the minimum necessary supporting structure was available.⁵⁴ These law and order operations pointed to the adequacy of military police structure for this function.

Summary

Numerous problems existed with both the planned and actual military police structure. While generally adequate to provide required support for this campaign, planning gaps, management of force arrival, and control of task organization at the target were sometimes deficient. Chapter four discusses operations in detail.

Endnotes

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³FM 19-5, *Military Police*, 216-217.

⁴Tenth Army, *Tentative Operation Plan 1-45* (Okinawa: n.p., 6 Jan 45), 1-10; XXIV Corps, *Action Report Ryukyus*, 1 Apr-30 Jun 45 (Okinawa: n.p., n.d.), 2-6.

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⁵PHIB 19, *Employment of Military Police [Obsolete]* (Marine Corps Schools, NC: n.p., 1945), Series on Amphibious Operations, 33vols, 1-48.

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⁷Phib 19, Part 1, Section 1, 2-3.

⁸1st Military Police Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, *Action Report of First Military Police Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific for Phases 1 and 2 of Okinawa Operation* (Okinawa: n.p., n.d.), 2; Madej, 161-165; Phib 19, Part 1, Section 1, 2.

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¹⁰Tenth Army, *Shore Party Instructions (draft)* (Okinawa: n.p., 10 Feb 45), 1-7; 1st Engineer Special Brigade, *Operations Plan "Iceberg"* (Okinawa: n.p., 4 Feb 45), Annex No.7, 1.

¹¹FM 19-5, 179-191; USAFPOA, 77,80,99-100; Tenth Army, *Tentative Operations Plan 1-45*, 1-10.

¹²FM 19-5, 139-141; USAFPOA, 99-100.

¹³FM 19-5, 204-212; USAFPOA, 689-700; LTC J. K. Daly, USA, "Thirty Thousand Prisoners of War Over the Beach" *Military Review* (April 1945).

¹⁴FM 19-5, 202-203; Tenth Army, *Action Report Ryukyus, 26 March to 30 June 1945* 3 vols., (Okinawa: n.p., 3 Sep 45), PII-XXII-1.

¹⁵USAFPOA, 77-80, 99-100; FM 19-5, 219-220; 51st Military Police Battalion, *Action Report, 10 Jan 1945-30 June 1945* (Okinawa: n.p., 30 June 1945), 1-8; 1st MPBn, FMFPac, *Action Report, Phases I & II*, 1-8.

¹⁶FM 19-5, 42-45.

¹⁷Phib 19, 13-26.

¹⁸USAFPOA, 77-80; Tenth Army, *Tentative Operations Plan 1-45*, Annex 3, 1-10.

¹⁹USAFPOA, 99-100, 708; Tenth Army, *Action Report*, PII-XXII-1.

²⁰FM 19-5, 161-162; Basic Field Manual 27-10, (FM 27-10), *Rules of Land Warfare*, (War Department, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1940), 18-21.

²¹FM 19-5, 164-168.

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²³FM 19-5, 66-68, 155-160; Phib 19, Part 2, Section 4, 34-38; FM 27-10, 74-85.

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²⁹Tenth Army, *Tentative Operations Plan*, Annex 3, 11; FM 19-5, 188-191.

³⁰FM 19-5, 219-220; Tenth Army, *Tentative Operations Plan 1-45*, Annex 13.

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³³FM 19-5, 11-19, 20-28, 31, 139-141; Tenth Army, *Tentative Operations Plan 1-45*, 15-19; Annex 13, Appendix H, 1 & Annex 13, Appendix I, 1-3.

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³⁵Tenth Army, *Action Report*, P11-IV-8.

³⁶Ibid., P11-IV-8.

³⁷Tenth Army, *Action Report*, P11-XXII-3,8; 6th Marine Division, *Special Action Report*, VII-11,12; XXIV Corps, *Action Report*, 34; III Marine Amphibious Corps, *Action Report, Phases I & II*, 125, 216.

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⁴⁰Tenth Army, *Action Report*, P11-XXII-4.

⁴¹USAFPOA, 708-709; Tenth Army, *Action Report*, P11-XI-9; XXIV Corps, *Action Report*, 67-69.

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⁴³Iheya-Aguni Landing Force, *Action Report* (Okinawa: 25 June 1945), VII 2, 1-7, X 1.

⁴⁴Tenth Army, *Action Report*, P11-XXII-6, 7.

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⁴⁶USAFPOA, 218-220.

⁴⁷Provost Marshal, 1st Engineer Special Brigade, *Military Police Activities Okinawa Beach Service Area* (Okinawa: n.p., 17 July 1945), 1-3; USAFPOA, 708.

⁴⁸6th Marine Division, *Special Action Report*, Phases I&II, VII 47 and Phase III, III 51.

⁴⁹6th Marine Division, *Special Action Report*, Phase III, VII 47-48, 50-51; Tenth Army, *Action Report*, P11-XXVII-4.

⁵⁰Provost Marshal, 1st Engineer Special Brigade, 2-3; 1st MPBn, FMFPac, *Action Report*, Phases I & II, 5.

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⁵⁴Tenth Army, *Action Report*, P11-XXII-5; 1st MPBn, FMFPac, *Action Report*, Phases I & II, 1-8; *Supplemental Action Report*, 1-4; Provost Marshal, 1st Engineer Special Brigade, 1-3.

CHAPTER FOUR
MILITARY POLICE OPERATIONS EVALUATION

General

The military police operations conducted during the Okinawa campaign proved numerous and diverse. As in chapter three, this chapter considers five functional or mission areas: Traffic control operations, prisoner of war operations, civilian handling operations, security operations, and law and order operations. Doctrinal criteria for these five mission areas which was presented in chapter three and will not be reiterated. However, additional functional criteria is discussed. Planning conducted and operational results are assessed within the framework of these five mission areas.

Operational Planning Assessment

Traffic Control Operations Planning

Field Manual (FM) 19-5, *Military Police, and Amphibious Operations* (Phib) Volume 19, *Employment of Military Police*, both provided military police planners with detailed guidance for the planning of traffic control operations. These sources both point out the dependent relationship of the military police traffic control plan upon the approved traffic circulation plan prepared by the G-4. The ideal control plan resulted in proper placement and coordination of traffic controls to compliment the circulation plan and consider contingencies.¹

Review of available operation plans and administrative plans revealed significant development of traffic policy. Systems for numbering and lettering routes, posting of signs, area responsibilities, and functional responsibilities were presented in these documents. At each level a traffic circulation plan was discussed, however, only the 2d Marine Division Order included a traffic circulation diagram. U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Area Selected Observers noted that numerous traffic circulation plans were not prepared prior to landing nor were they available for immediate implementation.²

The inference exists that detailed control planning was delayed by the absence of timely circulation plans. However, the Tenth Army G-4 reported that the Army traffic circulation map required very few changes, indicating a plan existed at the start of the campaign. The Tenth Army Provost Marshal spoke further to this issue noting that original plans proved satisfactory. Finally, the Provost Marshal reported that military police ashore on L+1 had strip maps in their possession which had been prepared aboard ship from aerial photographs. In contrast, the 1st Military Police Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific put together their traffic control plans subsequent to arriving at the III Amphibious Corps command post at Onna Point. This occurred for two reasons. First, the battalion, as discussed in chapter three, landed late on L+11. Second, the 6th Marine Division had made quick and sizable gains expanding the Corps zone of action to the north. The planning conducted at Onna actually involved the battalion's follow-on planning subsequent to the assault.³

Traffic circulation planning at various levels was criticized as untimely; however, timely military police traffic control planning did

occur. Such initial traffic control planning attempted to meet basic doctrinal standards. The Provost Marshal, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, and the Provost Marshal, Tenth Army studied potential differences in traffic control requirements from previous Pacific Ocean Areas operations. Finally, untimely traffic circulation planning by some units failed to achieve doctrinal objectives: complimentary traffic control and circulation planning. Ultimately, these two processes occurred independent of each other or in reverse order at some levels within the Tenth Army.⁴

Prisoner of War Operations Planning

Doctrinal prisoner of war operations planning required consideration of several basic components: handling, collecting points, evacuation, and inclosures. FM 19-5 and Phib 19 both addressed each of these areas. Depending upon the given stage of an amphibious operation, responsibilities for each of these areas varied. Within the beachhead the shore party commander was responsible; however, this was generally a military police function in the traditional rear area.⁵

Basic handling guidance was aimed at protection of the prisoners rights under Field Manual (FM) 27-10, *Rules of Land Warfare*. Collection points provided a coordinated location for tactical units to deliver prisoners. These were normally operated by the division military police platoon or company, the unit also responsible for evacuation of prisoners to inclosures.⁶

Inclosures were doctrinally established by a corps or army in a combat or communications zone. Large inclosures, termed central inclosures, were established by theater or field army commanders.

Prisoners were processed by a prisoner of war processing company at the inclosure in accordance with War Department requirements. The term, prisoner of war stockade, finds its way into the action reports of this campaign. This is not a doctrinal term for describing a prisoner of war facility. It generally refers to something between the collecting point and the inclosure described here. This facility is used at the division and corps level in addition to collecting points. It does not provide the permanent processing described above.⁷

As discussed in chapter three, the Tenth Army plan did not provide an estimate of prisoners to be captured. However, military police study of prisoners captured in the Philippines and other small island campaigns resulted in anticipation of larger numbers of prisoners. Corps military police units were initially tasked to establish and operate three prisoner of war inclosures or stockades: one by XXIV Corps and two by III Phib Corps. Subsequently, the 51st Military Police Battalion, Island Command, planned to assume control of the three corps inclosures.⁸

These plans provided detailed guidance for handling of prisoners, operation of collecting points, administration of inclosures, and evacuation of prisoners within both the beachhead and the various zones of action. The 1st Military Police Battalion used the Tenth Army concept for handling prisoners in both training and planning. The former Commanding Officer of Company A, Colonel Kenneth J. Becker, indicated that both the concept and the training were proper for what they encountered. These prisoner of war plans were all consistent with basic doctrine.⁹

Civilian Handling Operations Planning

The former G-3 of 6th Marine Division, Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, U. S. Marine Corps, Retired, noted that Okinawa was the division's first real experience with civilians. They realized that the Okinawans were not treated well by the Japanese. Even though they obeyed the Japanese, under American control they would be compliant, helpless, and require care. The Tenth Army planned to be compassionate, provide food, and medical attention in the context of the tactical situation.¹⁰

FM 19-5 discussed the supreme authority of a military government over lands, property, and inhabitants of an enemy territory. Phib 19 provided practical guidance on the importance and techniques for handling and controlling civilians. Military police missions again included both security and law and order functions previously depicted in chapter three.¹¹

Numerous articles on civil affairs, military government, enemy civilians, and related planning provided additional lessons learned in prior campaigns. The considerations of international law, the impact on combat and supporting operations in the Marianas, the extreme behavior of Japanese civilians on Saipan, and planning considerations for the Marianas were among the topics included.¹² This operation planned to integrate military police with military government relieving military police of all but security considerations. As such, military police planners primarily considered numbers of civilians and their attitudes.¹³

Finally, military police anticipation of requirements for controlling civilians is evidenced in pre-operation training. Both Marines and soldiers conducted language training designed to facilitate basic

communication between military police and the Okinawans. Classes and lectures were designed to develop appropriate attitudes focusing on relief and protection of these civilians. Training recognized that these units contained combat veterans with potentially hostile attitudes toward enemy civilians.¹⁴

The three battalions of military police support pushed forward into the assault echelon clearly reflected an appreciation for the scope of civilian handling operations anticipated. Policies considered security first by initially treating all civilians as prisoners. Second, policy addressed relief operations and protection of civilians. Last, prohibitions of American contact with Okinawan civilians enhanced both security for Tenth Army forces and the civilians residing in military government inclosures. Civilian handling operations are not remembered being of primary importance by all veterans; however, planning inferred that they were the largest anticipated challenge.¹⁵

Planning satisfied most doctrinal standards incorporating significant detail. However, there was no specific policy for the use of force with civilians. Neither documentation or the recollection of veterans revealed any explanation. While not addressed in Phib 19, FM 19-5 provided specific guidance in this area. This was a significant planning failure. Excepting this problem, civilian handling operations planning was doctrinal, thorough, and adequate for the operational setting.¹⁶

Security Operations Planning

Security planning failed to adequately consider three specific areas; airfield security, command post security, and engineer and naval

construction battalion site security. There is no indication of planning in any of these areas. First, airfield considerations are entirely absent in plans, yet military police action reports refer to significant support provided at both Kadena and Yontan airfields throughout the campaign. Second, the only discussion of command post security found in plans addresses a prohibition on moving or holding prisoners or civilians within sight or hearing of any command post. Here also, military police action reports and recollections of veterans indicate security operations to protect command posts from the Army level down occurred. Specific detachments were formed in accordance with FM 19-5 for protection of the Commanding General, Tenth Army and the Commanding General, Island Command. There is no evidence of this in pre-operation planning. Third, numerous military police units were attached to engineer and naval construction battalion units for security of equipment, personnel, and key sites such as bridges. This is also neglected in available plans.¹⁷

Finally, neither the Provost Marshal, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas or the Provost Marshal, Tenth Army considered these issues in planning as evidenced by respective action reports. There is no evidence that the doctrinal standards identified in chapter three were met.¹⁸

Law and Order Operations Planning

Two principal areas of law and order doctrine were addressed in chapter three; straggler control and general enforcement. Plans addressed each of these areas regarding policy and prohibitions. Military police controls and schemes for enforcement were also generally addressed. There is no indication of specific plans for straggler control points, lines, or

patrols prior to landing. Nor is there any indication of specific plans for law enforcement patrols or posts. Neither of these functions were expected to require significant attention until later in the campaign. This may account for the absence of this specific planning.¹⁹

Operational Results Assessment

Traffic Control Operations

The first point of focus for traffic operations was the beachhead. FM 19-5 clearly listed the first duty of military police in the beachhead as traffic control. There are mixed reviews on military police effectiveness in this area. The Tenth Army G-1 complained of inadequate traffic control on the beaches to guide debarking units to assembly areas. It is noted that the Tenth Army Headquarters came ashore on L+17. XXIV Corps reported no congestion on their beaches early in the operation. The III Marine Amphibious Corps action report indicated no congestion on their beaches on L+2; however, it was noted that the shore party military police landed too late to perform efficiently. These military police were provided by the 1st Military Police Battalion, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific which landed eight days late on L+11. The former Company A commanding officer of this unit, Colonel Becker, stated, "We were playing catch-up ball on the beach since we landed late. If we were to provide any real control, we should have landed much earlier."²⁰

Companies A and B of the 1st Military Police Battalion established traffic posts, information booths, and radio jeep patrols of the roads. Jeeps conducted convoy escort, cleared roads, reported road conditions, reported on civilian concentrations, and enforced traffic regulations. Colonel Becker stated, "My Company handled traffic control up

to Motobu, but not any further." Approximately sixty percent of this battalion was involved primarily in traffic control. Becker noted, "These operations were very effective. We kept civilians off of supply lines. We kept supply lines open."²¹

Companies C and D remained with the Corps Service Group at the North Shore Party Area. Company C established traffic posts, information booths, and straggler collection points from Bishagawa north to Bolo point including Route 3 and all of the territory east to the Ocean. Company D performed the same functions in a zone parallel to C Company along the west coast running north to the road junction of Routes 1 and 6. The Provost Marshal, Service Group exercised operational control of these companies. The former Executive Officer of Company C, Colonel James H. McCrocklin U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, recalled, "Traffic was the most important function we had. It was a function of mobility. Other than landing late the operations went well."²²

As previously noted, III Amphibious Corps divisions left military police behind at key intersections as a result of the absence of the Corps Shore Party military police. 6th Marine Division noted that their military police organization for shore party was adequate and efficient. This was demonstrated by their ability to expand their military police support from the beachhead as they turned north.²³

The 519th Military Police Battalion was largely split up among their divisions. Company A provided the 7th Infantry Division with traffic control in the Division zone of action. 1st Platoon was attached to the Corps Shore Party until relieved on L+18. Company B provided traffic control in numerous areas; 1st Platoon at the Tenth Army Command Post, 2d

Platoon in the vicinity of Kue and Chatan, and 3d Platoon in the XXIV Corps area east of Hagushi beaches. Company C also had 1st Platoon attached to the Corps Shore Party until relieved on L+18. Additionally, on L+14, 2d Platoon, Company A and the 3d Platoon, Company C were attached to the Island Command Shore Party for traffic control.

The 519th Military Police Battalion was fully engaged in traffic control from the moment it came ashore. As noted above, the XXIV Corps reported no traffic problems on its beaches. Distinctive Green and yellow information booths were established by the 519th Military Police Battalion early in the operation. These were increased to cover important traffic centers as the tactical situation developed. These posts provided invaluable assistance to drivers, maintained current situation maps, and rerouted traffic as required.²⁴

As indicated by the Provost Marshal, 1st Engineer Special Brigade, military police were initially sufficient in the beach maintenance area. All who were available were assigned to traffic control and evacuation of civilians from the roads in this area. Due to road conditions, traffic became congested but never stopped moving. Extensive civilian handling requirements made it necessary to relieve military police from traffic posts and patrols to collect these civilians. Main supply roads were still being developed throughout this period. Construction of the Kadena traffic circle aided greatly with the speed, flow, and handling of traffic. After construction of the circle, bottlenecks only occurred on Route 1 crossing the Bishagawa and at other bridges along Route 1. In spite of the late arrival of the 1st Military Police Battalion and the 51st Military Police

Battalions traffic operations within the beachhead were generally successful.²⁵

The system for marking routes proved very satisfactory, however, signs prepared in Oahu received unsatisfactory distribution delaying the proper marking of routes. Military police assisted posting signs; thus personnel were diverted who had been planned for traffic posts. In spite of this, traffic control at all levels was excellent. Most difficulties were due to road conditions. The original Tenth Army plans proved satisfactory, as evidenced by the Provost Marshal's tour of the Island on L+1. Well informed Military Police armed with maps were on duty on the beaches and along the main roads.²⁶

Next it is appropriate to examine traffic control as the operations expanded ashore. The 6th Marine Division made quick and sweeping progress in the north. Much of this expansion occurred simultaneously with development of the beachhead. Military police support for the 6th Marine Division drive came from Companies A and B, 1st Military Police Battalion as discussed above. As the operation progressed rapidly, more of the island was uncovered and traffic control was hampered. The lack of military police, the number of civilians, the requirement for dump guards, and significant elements of the military police force were still afloat, precluded establishing all of the desired traffic posts. This problem was corrected as more military police became available.²⁷

The entire III Amphibious Corps displaced from the north and central areas of Okinawa to Tenth Army lines in the south during the first week of May. Movements of divisions in and out of Tenth Army lines were controlled by the Tenth Army Provost Marshal Section in close coordination

with the III Amphibious Corps and XXIV Corps Provost Marshal Sections. The Tenth Army, Provost Marshal's report indicates the moves were all completed without any difficulty. The 6th Marine Division used their military police effectively for their divisional move to southern Okinawa between L+31 and L+35. A movement plan with overlay, routes of march, rates of march, and specific instructions to military police was incorporated in Operation Order number 49-45 on L+29.²⁸

On L+35, the 1st Military Police Battalion began supervising the moves south of 1st Marine Division, 6th Marine Division, and the III Amphibious Corps Command Post. The Battalion displaced to the new Corps Command Post in the vicinity of Futenma on L+39. As noted by the Tenth Army Provost Marshal, these major moves went without difficulty.²⁹

Dust and rain caused delays throughout the operation. The roads had poor bottoms, and heavy traffic ground roads into clouds of dust and then seas of mud. Check points were established within corps' boundaries to screen out unessential vehicle traffic. On L+59 III Amphibious Corps began control of traffic by convoy only. Screening found several hundred vehicles per day in forward areas having no connection with combat operations. In May traffic posts south of the Island Command boundary were covered jointly by Marine and Army military Police. Information booths were established at key intersections. These booths provided valuable assistance which kept traffic moving smoothly. Roads did not improve until mid-June.³⁰

In the south, the III Amphibious Corps rear area was divided between two companies of the 1st Military Police Battalion. There was one way traffic on the main supply routes. The roads would not sustain two way

traffic except around Naha. This system was not trouble free. Becker stated, "Some personnel were insistent that they come back the same way they went. Nothing would have gotten down that road. So, we insisted that they follow the one-way circuit. It worked well."³¹

Traffic control became critical during the monsoons between mid-May and early June. By L+60 rain and traffic rendered routes five and thirteen in the XXIV Corps zone impassable. All overland movement of troops and supplies for five divisions had to be routed over Route 1 through III Amphibious Corps zone of action. An average of twelve hundred vehicles traveled in each direction daily. Close liaison, constant traffic control, and rigid traffic screening maintained the flow of ammunition and equipment to the front line troops. Major General Roy S. Geiger, Commanding General, of the III Amphibious Corps formally recognized 1st Military Police Battalion's successful effort.³²

The 519th Military Police Battalion shared traffic posts with Marines of the III Amphibious Corps during this period as efforts intensified to limit traffic on deteriorating main supply routes. The 519th Military Police Battalion and the XXIV Corps Staff Judge Advocate established mobile traffic courts operated with military police patrols. One company was focused on traffic control for the Corps at any time. Company A was relieved on L+45 by Company B. These units manned posts, ran patrols, and conducted road blocks along the Corps boundary. Company B shared a post at Chatan with military police from the 1st Marine Division.³³

Continued deterioration and closure of roads in the XXIV Corps area intensified traffic control throughout the Army combat zone in early

June. XXIV Corps military police assisted III Marine Amphibious Corps military police with control of XXIV Corps traffic on Route 1 while Routes 13 and 5 were closed.³⁴

U.S. Army Forces Pacific Ocean Areas Observer reports indicated there was a need for more properly trained military police. It suggested that if traffic control had been promptly established, some roads in the XXIV Corps zone of action would not have been lost.³⁵ The Tenth Army Engineer reported that subsequent to the loss of supply Routes 13 and 5, Route 1 was only kept open between L+51 and L+65 through rigid traffic control and twenty four hour a day engineer operations.³⁶

Traffic control during the final part of the campaign was hampered by dense pockets of remaining civilians. The effects of lost supply routes in the east were still evident. Supply operations employed air and water lines of communication to relieve the stress on roads. The III Marine Amphibious Corps evaluated traffic control as satisfactory, but movement of troops and supplies required strenuous effort. It was noted that control could have been better.³⁷

The 51st Military Police Battalion also provided traffic control at numerous times in the campaign. When Company A reverted to battalion control, it provided traffic posts and patrols around Hiza in the vicinity of the Island Command. Company C moved to the Island Command prisoner of war stockade near Kadena also providing traffic control in that area. Company D provided traffic control along the Bishagawa. On L+60, Company D reverted back to Battalion control. Traffic control shifted from south of the Bishagawa river to northside and expanded northward. Company A continued to patrol the Island Command Area in early May. Company B also

provided traffic control at Kadena Airfield and a 16 square mile area at Shimobuku with traffic posts and patrols in May. Company C continued to provide control of traffic in the area around Kadena. The 51st Military Police Battalion provided traffic control throughout the Island Command area. These operations were all completed effectively without difficulty.³⁸

Traffic control in outlying island operations is characterized by operations on Iheya Shima by the 3d Platoon, 2d Marine Division Military Police Company. This platoon's support for shore party was augmented by Marines of a 35 man replacement draft. Heavy rain and deep mud forced tanks and artillery vehicles to remain in dumps during unloading. Avoidance of serious traffic congestion was attributed to good traffic control. The S-4 indicated that the doctrinal compliment of military police was insufficient for handling both traffic operations and civilians simultaneously.³⁹

Traffic control operations were effective except in two areas. First, the late arrival of the 1st Military Police Battalion and elements of the 51st Military Police Battalion significantly hampered Corps-level shore party operations in the Hagushi beachhead. This setback was compensated for by flexible military police from the Marine Divisions, and the 1st Military Police Battalion's ability to quickly gain control once ashore. Second, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, Selected Observers reported that better preventative traffic controls could have precluded the loss of Routes 13 and 5 in the XXIV Corps zone. In contrast the III Amphibious Corps incorporated a rigid one-way traffic circuit prior to the rains, and dedicated two companies to traffic control in the Corps area.

As a result, Route 1 was not lost. This effort resulted in continued sustainment of the Tenth Army front. In spite of these problems, traffic control operations were ultimately effective.

Prisoner of War Operations

The two corps and their division military police units were responsible for prisoner of war operations. According to plan, three stockades were established initially: one by XXIV Corps and two by III Amphibious Corps. On order Island Command planned to assume control of the three corps or division stockades. The G-1, Tenth Army noted that administrative considerations made it necessary to vary from the basic plan. There is no other specific reason given for this change. The Island Command established a central Island Command inclosure instead on L+16. A single inclosure was sufficient for the numbers of prisoners captured.⁴⁰

Once established, all prisoners were evacuated to the central inclosure directly from the divisions. The first prisoners of war received by Island Command arrived on L+20. Initially, they were guarded by the 1st Platoon, 162d Military Police Company at the central inclosure in the vicinity of Kadena airfield. Later, these prisoners were handled by elements of the 51st Military Police Battalion.⁴¹

The temporary central inclosure was surrounded by a six foot four strand barbed wire fence. Salvaged shelter halves over slit trenches provided the only shelter for prisoners. Food included K and C rations supplemented with native food when possible. Water had to be hauled and transportation was scarce. Sanitation had to be taught to the prisoners, the most difficult problem to address.⁴²

Control of prisoners was easy since English speaking prisoners transmitted orders to the others, but problems did occur. In one instance, a prisoner on a working party cut American phone lines. In another instance, six prisoners escaped from the central inclosure. All of them were recaptured or accounted for in several days. These type instances were the exception. The greatest percentage of the prisoners initially were Korean or Okinawan labor troops. The first Japanese were mostly wounded, a factor limiting resistance. Segregation in the temporary Island Command central inclosure was limited to officers.⁴³

Counterintelligence Corps teams screened prisoners daily. Some bonefide civilians were found among prisoners and turned over to military government. Those prisoners with established prisoner of war status were permanently processed by the 1st Platoon of the 162d Military Police Company. This platoon processed prisoners smoothly and efficiently. On L+90, 10,740 prisoners had been interned. This included 120 prisoners of war from outlying islands, 1,093 wounded prisoners, and labor troops. Many soldiers were found in civilian inclosures, others continued to be captured after the island was secured, many were found hiding in caves, and there was a sizable guerrilla force in north Okinawa.⁴⁴

Construction of a new and larger compound at Yaka began in June. Company A and Company B (less the 1st Platoon) of the 51st Military Police Battalion operated the Yaka compound. By L+81, eight thousand prisoners of war had been processed. The permanent Island Command inclosure was opened on L+83 at Yaka with a capacity to hold 15,000 prisoners. The temporary inclosure at Kadena transferred to the military government for use as a civilian inclosure.⁴⁵

The Provost Marshal Section, Tenth Army operated a special interrogation center for the G-2 where reliable sources were interrogated. The Provost Marshal utilized military police assigned to the Army Command Post from the 519th Military Police Battalion.⁴⁶

Whereas XXIV Corps initially operated a prisoner of war stockade for its divisions, the III Amphibious Corps did not maintain a regular prisoner of war stockade. The 2 initial stockades referred to were established and operated by both of the Marine Divisions. These 3 stockades were necessary prior to establishment of the Island Command central inclosure. 1st Marine Division noted that the prisoner evacuation process was satisfactory. On L+43, the 1st Military Police Battalion opened a Corps prisoner of war stockade adjacent to a Marine Brig. This Corps inclosure handled an average of 11 prisoners each day. The Battalion also provided guards for wounded prisoners at Corps hospitals.⁴⁷

Early in the operation while supporting the III Amphibious Corps, the companies of the 51st Military Police Battalion operated prisoner of war inclosures and collecting points in close proximity to civilian inclosures and collecting points. An estimated 2% of the civilians collected were actually prisoners of war. On L+60, Company A operated the Island Command prisoner of war inclosure at Kadena. Between L+80 and L+83, Company A operated the new Island Command central inclosure at Yaka containing 12,000 prisoners. This number included bonafide civilians subsequently transferred to civilian inclosures.

Initially, the 1st Platoon, 162d Military Police Company furnished interpreters, assisted in running the inclosure, and processed prisoners. On L+21, Company C reverted back to battalion control and took

over operation of the Island Command inclosure at Kadena. By L+30, the 1st Platoon, 162d Military Police Company had processed 250 prisoners in addition to initially operating the inclosure. They continued until late in June when numbers dramatically increased. During the month of May, this Platoon was required to augment the inclosure guard from L+70 to L+76 and L+79 to L+86. During these two periods processing temporarily ceased. Interruptions limited processing for this single platoon. The platoon was forced to stop processing at least four times during the campaign in order to augment security.⁴⁸

Within the XXIV Corps zone of action, the problem of handling civilians was also much larger than prisoner of war considerations. As a result, some prisoner of war functions were consolidated with civilian handling functions. The Provisional Company, 519th Military Police Battalion established collecting points for the 27th Infantry Division. Late in the operation, Company A intensified prisoner of war operations around Koza, Yonabaru, and Tamagusuku. The 519th Military Police Battalion was continuously involved handling prisoners of war throughout the operation.

These operations provided viable evacuation of prisoners, positive control of prisoners, support for intelligence and counterintelligence operations, protection of prisoners, care of prisoners, and permanent processing of prisoners. Evidence that insufficient military police were available to cope with prisoner of war operations simultaneously with other missions clearly exists. In spite of that deduction, these operations achieved their desired results without any negative impact on the campaign or the forces involved.

Civilian Handling Operations

These operations constituted the largest and most complex mission area confronting military police. Doctrine proposed control of the population, safeguarding of the population, and protection of civil records, currency, and property to the greatest extent possible. Planners clearly recognized this challenge, as three battalions of military police plus corps and division organic assets were landed in the assault echelon to handle civilians. This mission area, like traffic control, promised to impact the tactical situation directly if improperly handled.⁴⁹

The principal military police unit planned to support military government operations was the 52d Military Police Battalion. This Battalion guarded civilians in 23 military government camps.⁵⁰ However, it was necessary to use military police assets organic to combat units to handle civilians at numerous times during the campaign. Military police kept natives inside inclosures at night and guarded them in fields gathering food during the day. The Okinawans continually attempted to evade their guards to return to their former homes for clothing or other personal affects. Others simply wanted to be free of the restraint imposed. Unescorted civilians were not permitted to travel anywhere on the island. This prevented Japanese soldiers from moving and posing as civilians, it prevented civilians from feeding enemy soldiers, and it prevented civilians from being mistakenly killed. Military police attempted to keep guerrillas away from civilians. Some instances existed where raiding Japanese killed civilians suspected of cooperating with the Americans. Military police also kept unauthorized Americans away from civilian inclosures.⁵¹

Due to logistical design, the 52d Military Police Battalion did not land early enough to handle civilians in the initial stages of the operation. Military Police assigned to the military government should have landed with them. As a result, the 3 companies from the 51st Military Police Battalion which landed in the assault echelon with the III Amphibious Corps played a critical role as 6th Marine Division began to quickly push north. Additionally, division military police were actively engaged with significant numbers of civilians even before military government teams came ashore. This requirement imposed upon the ability of these units to perform other planned missions.⁵²

Numerous civilians were encountered moving in the beach maintenance area. A civilian inclosure was constructed but went unmanned initially. Civilians would leave the inclosure and return to their villages. Military police were ultimately withdrawn from traffic posts to collect and control civilians. The Tenth Army Military Government action report noted that difficulty was encountered controlling the circulation of large groups of civilians with limited numbers of military police. Civilian collecting points were operated as far forward as possible by military police, military government, and counterintelligence.⁵³

The Okinawans were generally cooperative and docile. A large percentage were women, children, and the elderly. No Japanese fanaticism was experienced among those civilians successfully taken into American custody. No concrete cases of civilian espionage or sabotage occurred. The Okinawans did not fear the Americans as much as they feared the ravages of war. However, too few interpreters and military police hindered

military government operations. Furthermore, too few interpreters hampered military police operations.⁵⁴

In addition to security of inclosures, military police details from the XXIV Corps collected livestock until the Island Command units took over. On I+77, 2 companies were attached to Island Command to handle large numbers of civilians and prisoners collected in the final days of fighting.⁵⁵ Daily convoys from the III Amphibious Corps of approximately 50 trucks peddled civilians to whatever Island Command camps would accept them. These convoys had to travel long distances from the south requiring precious transportation and limited military police escorts. Late in June, the Corps evacuated 21,967 civilians from the Island Command area because Island Command did not have sufficient resources available. This was a 75 hour operation tying up trucks and troops.⁵⁶ In each case above, assets organic to combat units assisted an overburdened garrison force ensuring mission accomplishment.

The 1st Military Police Battalion worked closely with the III Amphibious Corps C-1, C-4, the Corps Military Police Company, and the Military Government Section. The battalion evacuated 1602 civilians in the first 8 days. They also provided guards at inclosures and chasers for civilian working parties.

Two platoons attached to 6th Marine Division, a reinforced platoon attached to 1st Marine Division, and 2 officers augmented the Corps Military Government Section. These detachments operated at Sobe, Jima, China, Nakadamaru, and the Ishigawa-Chimu area. They relieved much larger Army military police companies of the 51st Military Police Battalion, but performed the same scope missions satisfactorily. During Phase III of the

campaign, one platoon was attached to 1st Marine Division, and a reinforced platoon was attached to 6th Marine Division to handle civilians. The 1st Military Police Battalion provided substantial support to the Marine Divisions, III Amphibious Corps, and Island Command.⁵⁷ Becker summarized the battalion's experience with civilians:

Small groups of military police from the company not involved in traffic control would be sent out to pickup civilians from collection points or find them. A dozen or so would come out of a cave, get on the narrow roads, interfere with traffic, and slow the advance of supplies.⁵⁸

Becker further recalled:

The use of force was applied at face value. There was no policy per se. Women and children were no trouble, and the males were largely cooperative in the presence of women and children. You just pointed which way that you wanted them to go and they would go. The males by themselves were always treated with some caution.⁵⁹

Periodically, these Marines would experience significant quantities of civilians, but they were all extremely cooperative. However, the first task of collecting civilians was sometimes difficult. Military Police would look into a cave and observe movement, but due to the language barrier receive no response to commands. Marines would sometimes open fire into the cave. Becker recalled, "One Sergeant came to me once saying that he had killed two Okinawans; he was really bothered by this."⁶⁰

The 519th Military Police Battalion provided this same type of civilian handling support to the XXIV Corps and its divisions. Company A operated the 7th Infantry Division civilian stockade and controlled civilians at Shimabuku. In June, the Company handled civilians at Yonabaru, Atanniya, Nodake, Koza, and Tamagusuku. Company B handled civilians in the XXIV Corps area at Chatan and Momoboru between early in the operation. Company C handled civilians at Ginowan and Shimabuku in

April. In June, Company C controlled civilians at Shinzato, Hyakuna, Yabiku, Funakushi, and Yonabaru. On L+18, the Battalion formed a provisional Company to attach to and support the 27th Infantry Division. This Company ran the civilian inclosure at Momoboru, forward collecting points, an intermediate inclosure, and a rear inclosure. This support continued until L+33 when the company was disbanded.⁶¹

The 51st Military Police Battalion engaged in extensive civilian control operations during the initial stages of this operation. Company A established multiple temporary compounds at Soba, Usa, Jima, Nagahama, and China. The Company also established compounds at Toya, Magdam, Nakadamari and Ishikawa.

Company B worked with civilians at Sobe, Chibana, Gushikawa, and Ishimine-Kutoku. This Company moved 10,000 civilians and prisoners to Chibana. Their convoys were strafed and attacked by snipers. Extensive numbers of civilians were pushed out on the Katchin Peninsula and fenced off from friendly forces as an immediate temporary control. This company established outposts to pickup civilians and conducted foot patrols with military government teams forward of friendly lines to locate, capture, and protect civilians, records, and property. B Company guarded Island Command civilian inclosures at Shimobaru, Koza, Takabaru, and Maibaru. They were relieved of duty in early May at these compounds by military police from the 52d Military Police Battalion.

Company C followed the 6th Marine Division north working with the military government teams. This company established civilian collecting points at China, Toya, Chema, Takeshi, Usa, Nagahama, Ishikawa, Futsuki, Tancha, Nakadamari, Yaka, Nago, Onna, and Taira. It also patrolled ahead

of combat units with military government teams to locate and protect civil records and property. C Company attached two platoons to the Island Command Military Government Section to assist with large numbers of civilians at the end of the campaign.⁶²

Even though the 52d Military Police Battalion functioned near exclusively handling civilians with the Military Government Section, there is negligible information about their operations. The bulk of their responsibilities encompassed support to the various military government teams focused primarily on the operation of camps and inclosures.⁶³

Late in the campaign in the south, the Tenth Army found large groups of civilians. In one particular case the 6th Marine Division found approximately five hundred in a quarry. The division military police took control of this large group and cared for them. The former G-3 of 6th Marine Division, Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, U. S. Marine Corps, Retired, commented:

These operations took the load of handling civilians away from combat units. The principal problems were those of magnitude. Our military police had never done this before. I believe they were quite well trained. We benefited early from the Okinawan willingness to cooperate.⁶⁴

As noted by Krulak, the first significant problem was based upon the periodic magnitude or volume of civilians requiring control. In the north, the 6th Marine Division uncovered civilians much more quickly than anticipated. The late arrival of the 1st Military Police Battalion, the 52d Military Police Battalion, and elements of the 51st Military Police Battalion complicated this. In addition, the three companies of the 51st Military Police Battalion attached to III Amphibious Corps returned to

Island Command control while the 6th Marine Division was still wrestling with sizable groups of civilians in the north.⁶⁵

Again, in the south, the volume of civilians encountered overwhelmed military police units. The 15th Marines formed a provisional military police unit for this reason. In spite of these problems, civilian handling operations were effective overall. Three thousand military police controlled three hundred thousand civilians.⁶⁶

Second, it appeared that the use of force in these operations was not properly regulated. As noted in the planning assessment, there was no policy reflecting doctrinal prescription, there were no non-lethal force options available, and mitigation of lethal force appeared to rely upon Okinawan cooperation and circumstance. Becker's recollections on this matter are tempered by the recollections of former Private First Class Salvatore Cavallaro, of the 1st Military Police Battalion. He stated,

Force in handling civilians was discussed, because we were going to take care of them. We had to clear caves and tunnels of the Japanese without killing the civilians that they took for cover. Accidents happened sometimes when Japanese soldiers hid in a crowd of civilians and used a weapon or grenade on the troops. Sometimes, troops would get trigger happy and open fire on the crowd. We would have to stop this if we could.⁶⁷

In spite of the lack of planned policy, use of force was covered in training. Military police understood that their job was to protect the Okinawans. This served to regulate the use of force.⁶⁸ Regardless of deficiencies, these operations achieved overall success in the face of a large and complex challenge.

Security Operations

Security operations, though largely unplanned, required a great deal of military police time and effort. Airfields, command posts, and other critical sites were secured by military police. The XXIV Corps G-2 credited military police security with denial of enemy tactical success in rear areas.⁶⁹

The 1st Military Police Battalion provided a wide range of security support. Daily roving patrols covering the Corps area encountered and neutralized small enemy concentrations. Tombs in the Corps zone were inspected and closed. During the last eight days of phases II, 1,290 tombs were inspected. Enemy encounters were customary: snipers, infiltrators in bivouac areas, and attacks on vehicles passing at night. During phases I and II members of this battalion killed 5 and wounded 4 Japanese soldiers.

During Phase III, one platoon provided security for the III Amphibious Corps rest camp at Onna. One platoon, attached to the 1st Separate Engineer Battalion, secured bridges, equipment, and controlled traffic around construction sites. Another platoon, attached to the 1st Naval Construction Battalion, provided night security of equipment and installations. Finally, a squad of 16 Marines was attached to various elements of the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area. Daily security patrols continued in the Corps area and 1981 tombs were inspected. During the entire operation, members of this unit killed a total of 24 and captured 13 Japanese soldiers.⁷⁰

The 51st Military Police Battalion was also engaged in a wide range of security functions. Company D, while attached to the 1st Engineer Special Brigade, provided 20 men as a special guard for the protection of

the Commanding General, Island Command. On L+22, this company dispatched military police to intercept two coral trucks reported as driven by Japanese soldiers. Company D provided scout cars to Yontan airfield and the South Beach Provost Marshal as a precaution against enemy paratroops. In May this company operated guard posts at Kadena airfield, yellow beach, the 43d Mobile Communication Unit, and the Island Command Tank Farm. Company A responded to Yontan airfield after enemy planes crash landed. The company guarded sites at Kadena and provided security patrols in the Island Command area. Company B encountered a small Japanese unit of infiltrators at Chibana, and killed 3 Japanese soldiers that night. Early in May, the company guarded supply dumps at Kadena airfield and responded to Yontan airfield when enemy aircraft crash landed. Company C while attached to 6th Marine Division, helped suppress a Banzai attack at Tancha. They supported the 521st Quartermaster Group by guarding supplies and ran a patrol at Kadena airfield to protect personnel against sniper fire. Finally, this company provided security for the 693d Ordnance Battalion dumps.⁷¹

The 519th Military Police Battalion was no exception in this mission area. It also provided the same range of security operations as the other battalions. Company A, attached to 7th Infantry Division, had its 1st Platoon providing security for the shore party in the South Shore Party Area. This security included area and dump guards. In May the company provided a guard detail at the 74th Hospital. The detail expanded to include guards for the nurses quarters in June. Finally, A Company also provided a platoon to guard the Corps dump. Company B provided guards to the 394 Holding Company, and the 71st Medical Battalion. The company

provided guards to the Corps dump. Company C, attached to 96th Infantry Division, had its 1st Platoon provide security to the shore party in the South Shore Party Area. This security included area and dump guards.⁷²

Finally, the Provost Marshal, 1st Engineer Special Brigade reported that the physical presence of sufficient Military Police brought a significant looting and pilferage problem on the beach under control through the use of walking patrols throughout the area.⁷³

Military Police units of the Tenth Army appear to have achieved positive results with these security operations. As the G-2 for XXIV Corps pointed out, military police security operations denied the Japanese tactical opportunity or advantage in the Tenth Army rear area. Despite the lack of planning for these operations, effective and measured application of this mission area helped provide force protection for the Tenth Army. In contrast to the value of these operations, there exists the competitive role with other mission areas for limited military police resources. The relative value or importance of guarding nurses quarters or a rest camp could not be compared to the need for additional traffic control or civilian handling capability. This is neither considered in relation to other mission areas or the critical military police junctures in the campaign. In retrospect, some of the assets dedicated to specific security operations at specific times could have possibly been used to better overall advantage.

Law and Order Operations

Neither of the two basic functions of this mission area presented problems when compared to other missions. Stragglers and pilfering, while

clearly problems, were not serious. Remedial and administrative measures helped control these problems.⁷⁴ Of these problems, the most significant was that of stragglers moving from rear to front for the purpose of souvenir hunting and looting. Military police recovered civilian property and turned it over to military government. Military police check points had great effect; stragglers were sent forward to bury enemy dead. At the end of the day they were returned to their units with a message for their commanding officer. Passes were issued to aid in the control of stragglers. Passes did not authorize travel forward of the corps rear boundary. These measures reduced the number of stragglers considerably. There were also very few stragglers during inclement weather.

Pilfering in supply dumps, on beaches, vehicle theft, and unauthorized access to civilian compounds represented the next most frequent offenses. Very few arrests were made for pilfering, but much stolen property was recovered. Unattended vehicles were frequently taken by stragglers or others and afterward abandoned. Many vehicles were improperly marked, repainted, or the losing unit was unable to identify the vehicle in detail. These factors greatly complicated the recovery process. Despite this obstacle, a considerable number of vehicles were recovered through the effective use of check points.

Another area of general law and order was prevention and response to crimes against the civilian population. There were a large number of native women, and specific efforts were made to keep troops away from civilian inclosures. In spite of this there were a few cases of rape that were ultimately investigated. Additionally, military police investigated the burning of native houses. These incidents were largely attributed to

stragglers. Violators were confined in the Island Command stockade, and on L+90 there were 95 soldiers, 2 sailors, and 3 Marines in the Island Command stockade.⁷⁵

The 1st Military Police Battalion investigated fires, accidents, and missing personnel. Members of this unit apprehended a deserter from a Navy Construction Battalion declared a deserter on the island of Guadalcanal. He was apprehended in the 6th Marine Division area. Additionally, spot check teams were established to locate stolen vehicles. The battalion recovered 50 stolen vehicles and returned them to their rightful owners. Also, 14 abandoned vehicles were turned over to the Provost Marshal, Tenth Army, and 62 Japanese vehicles were impounded between 25-30 June for delivery to the Island Command Provost Marshal. Stragglers were detained at the Battalion Brig until an officer from the individuals unit called for him. This was quite effective in cutting down the number of souvenir hunters each day.⁷⁶

The 51st Military Police Battalion had one company primarily conducting these operations. Company D provided detailed straggler control in the South Shore Party Area of the Hagushi beaches, and ran patrols along the south side of the Bishagawa. Additionally, these military police enforced Tenth Army regulations regarding the promiscuous firing of weapons. The company issued reports of delinquency for each violation identified. By mid-May the company had issued a total of four hundred and sixty two reports.⁷⁷

The Provost Marshal, 1st Engineer Special Brigade reported that no serious crimes were committed against civilians. Looting and pilferage were most significant initially, but ultimately reduced and brought under

control. The Criminal Investigation section of the 519th Military Police Battalion was left on the beach to investigate these problems. Five reported cases of robbery and thirty six reported cases of larceny occurred in the beach maintenance area. The largest problem was vehicle theft.

Apprehension of stragglers rivaled the scope of the vehicle theft problem. Approximately seven hundred and ninety stragglers were apprehended in the beach maintenance area between L+8 and L+60. This was primarily accomplished by the use of motor and foot patrols. Miscellaneous violations included resisting arrest, insubordination, or uniform violations; these made up the remainder of 1,133 reports of delinquency during this period.

Law and order operations achieved notable results considering the part time focus and priority that they received. Tenth Army military police units were generally successful accomplishing planned objectives in this area. These operations were also consistent with doctrinal criteria.

Summary

Military Police operations achieved planned objectives and were generally effective. Operational deficiencies resulted primarily from structural inadequacy and late force arrival, however, numerous operational planning oversights occurred. Detailed conclusions are provided in chapter five.

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CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

Structural Appropriateness

Military police structure planned to support the U. S. Tenth Army quantitatively met or exceeded doctrinal support relationships in all but two areas: support for Tactical Air Forces and support for Garrison Forces. Although structure provided military police assets for Kadena and Yontan airfields, it made no provision for development and rehabilitation of additional airfields on Okinawa. Additionally, doctrinal employment of a military police escort guard company within the Garrison Force or Island Command was not included or discussed in available plans.

Other doctrinal support relationships, while quantitatively adequate, deviated significantly from traditional task organization to meet functional requirements. Planners clearly demonstrated flexibility and insight as they shifted organizational emphasis forward in support of combat forces. Tenth Army shifted the 519th Military Police Battalion down to the XXIV Corps. The Fleet Marine Force, Pacific created the 1st Military Police Battalion and attached it to the III Marine Amphibious Corps. Finally, the Tenth Army jointly attached three companies of the 51st Military Police Battalion, Island Command to the III Amphibious Corps. Planners obviously appreciated the challenge facing the assault echelon by the scope of traditional military police functions in concert with civilian handling operations.

Curiously, the III Amphibious Corps received a large and disproportionate share of the military police support. This was due to the Tenth Army's need to move maximum numbers of military police ashore in the assault echelon combined with III Amphibious Corps' ability to embark these forces. Coincidentally, these forces provided an unintentional depth for III Amphibious Corps when the 1st Military Police Battalion came ashore eight days late. Further, these units were able to perform civilian handling functions tasked to the 52d Military Police Battalion which was not scheduled to arrive at Okinawa until phase III of the campaign.

Civilian handling operations posed the most significant requirement for military police in this campaign. The majority of the military police structure was planned to handle civilians at some point in the campaign. The inability of these forces to support voluminous operations at least twice during the campaign constituted a weakness in this mission area. Fragile plans to shift task organization during initial stages of the campaign sought to provide adequate support until garrison forces were established ashore. However, unexpected rapid gains in the north rendered plans inadequate in the face of increased population density prior to arrival of two military police battalions in the assault echelon: the 1st Military Police Battalion and the 51st Military Police Battalion.

Also, a task organization shift of elements of the 51st Military Police Battalion from III Amphibious Corps back to Island Command control required employment of combat forces of the 6th Marine Division to handle large numbers of civilians. The 1st Military Police Battalion ultimately supported the 6th Marine Division; however, it was spread out providing a full range of support from the Hagushi Beaches to the Motobu peninsula

In this case the overall force ashore was inadequate for the volume of civilians and concurrent missions. The poorly timed shift of task organization was caused primarily by the absence of the 52d Military Police Battalion. Whereas Island Command military government structure ashore was growing, their dedicated military police support, the 52d Military Police Battalion, would not achieve closure for same time. Ultimately, competing needs within the Garrison Forces impacted adversely upon combat forces.

Late in the campaign, the Tenth Army military police structure was wholly inadequate as maximum numbers of civilians were uncovered when other missions had reached maturity in scope and complexity. The III Amphibious Corps, faced with significant population density in their zone of action, tasked the 15th Marines to form a provisional military police detachment of company size. Additionally, the 1st Military Police Battalion and the Corps C-4 were required to support the Island Command in the handling of civilians since mission requirements exceeded the capabilities of their military police units.

In the outlying island operations, doctrinal military police support at lower levels proved inadequate to handle civilians and traffic control simultaneously. Additional support for these combat forces was obviously required. These units apportioned forces along doctrinallines and had no pool of additional support as at the corps-level.

Military police functional doctrine was considered in all but two areas: support for Tactical Air Forces and Island Command prisoner of war inclosures. There is no evidence in the U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Area plans, U.S. Tenth Army plans, or U.S. Tenth Army Garrison Forces or Island Command plans that either of these issues was properly considered.

First, the requirement for Tactical Air Force and respective airfield protection was obviously critical to the achievement of operational objectives stated in chapter one. Anticipated Japanese tactics discussed in chapter three should have further highlighted this requirement. Planners, as noted, programmed two aviation military police companies into the Tactical Air Force force structure. However, the absence of detailed airfield security plans, the unspecified size and structure of the two aviation military police companies employed, and the failure to structure for further base development disregarded doctrine and provided substandard support for mission.

As a result, planners did not program sufficient structure or properly anticipate the impact of these issues on other mission areas. Three of the four military police battalions provided essential support to both Kadena and Yontan airfields during the campaign. This clearly pointed out the inadequacy of both security planning and the structure of the two aviation military police companies assigned to these installations. On each occasion, these unplanned security requirements detracted from other ongoing missions.

Next, the absence of a military police escort guard company also reflected disparity between plans and doctrinal prescripts. As noted in chapters three and four, the Island Command planned to assume operation of the three corps prisoner of war inclosures once established ashore. The concept of Army-level or Island Command support for this mission area clearly inferred the doctrinal requirement for a military police escort guard company. However, planners placed this responsibility with the Island Command 51st Military Police Battalion by default.

The 51st Military Police Battalion, as discussed in chapters three and four, was tasked to provide a full range of military police support to the Island Command. This left little assurance that prisoner of war operations would not directly compete with other missions assigned to this battalion. Even though planners anticipated large numbers of prisoners, they failed to properly consider this estimate while developing Island Command structure. As a result, Island Command reduced prisoner inclosures to one central inclosure which the 1st Platoon, 162d Military Police Company, Prisoner of War Processing, guarded exclusively in the initial stages of the operation. This unit augmented security for this inclosure twice more during the campaign resulting each time in a temporary halt to prisoner of war processing.

Both of these deficiencies adversely impacted on other areas of military police operations by unnecessarily competing for limited assets. This factor was either not recognized by planners or could not be addressed due to exhaustion of military police assets available in the theater. Available information was not specific enough to permit a determination of the root cause. Additional unplanned missions included security of command posts, commanders, engineer sites, naval construction sites, and hospitals. Some of these missions complimented other mission areas. Others of these, such as the twenty man security detail for the Island Command Commanding General, were questionable uses of limited manpower. These unplanned requirements detracted from the priority required for traffic and civilian operations; mission areas with direct impact on the tactical situation.

Accepting this discussion, military police structural planning was still generally thorough considering the complex nature of numerous mission

areas and special organizations. It is absolutely crucial to note again that these planners identified the need for one additional battalion which could not be provided in the Pacific Theater. In spite of inefficiencies identified, a fifth battalion would have provided Island Command with sufficient assets to effectively support the Tenth Army combat forces vice detracting from them at points. Operations pointed out that this structure succeeded in accomplishing the mission except for three junctures in the campaign: midway through the assault echelon landing, mass civilian handling in the north, and mass civilian handling south. The first was attributable to the late arrival of units in the assault echelon. The second was due to the late arrival of garrison forces and poorly timed shifting of task organization within the assault echelon. Finally, the third was due to support requirements which exceeded military police capabilities at that point in the campaign. Planning gaps failed to reveal the impact that security and prisoner of war operations would have on the overall structure, but especially the Tactical Air Forces and the Garrison Forces. This last inadequacy points to the only real example where the structure was incapable of accomplishing the mission.

Operational Effectiveness

Operational planning, as assessed in chapter four, reveals doctrinal adherence in most mission areas. Actual operations were generally successful except for several specific problems. The first and, possibly, most important military police mission area was traffic control. Traffic control planning was conducted by military police in spite of the failure of some unit G-4 officers to produce traffic circulation plans

prior to arrival ashore. While crediting the military police for planning, these control plans did not compliment traffic circulation plans produced later. This issue was beyond the control of military police, but remained a deficiency nevertheless.

Traffic operations were successful except during two critical junctures in the campaign: from L+3 to L+11 and during the last week of May and the first week of June. The first period covers the initial assumption of control by the III Amphibious Corps Shore Party of the north half of the Hagushi beaches. The companies of the 1st Military Police Battalion designated to support the Corps Service Group had not landed and traffic problems mounted on the beach. Once ashore these Marines quickly gained control of traffic and successfully expanded north from Hagushi all the way to the Motobu peninsula. Initially this problem was due to the late arrival of this unit. Conversely, this battalion demonstrated high competency as they quickly gained positive control of a large and expanding zone of action.

Next, extreme weather during the last week of May and the first week of June caused the loss of Routes 5 and 13. However, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, Selected Observer reports criticized reactive traffic control in the XXIV Corps zone. The report stated that proactive control could have prevented the loss of these routes. In contrast, rigid, if not relentless joint traffic control was credited with the maintenance of Route 1 and the continued sustainment of both corps. It is clear that the III Amphibious Corps system of a one-way traffic circuit prior to the arrival of extreme weather conditions saved the principal supply route in their zone. Ultimately, this was critical to the Tenth Army's ability to

sustain their combat forces. Considering the poor nature and conditions of these roads, overall traffic control operations were successful and of operational value to the Tenth Army.

The next significant mission area involved the handling of Okinawan civilians. This function also had significant impact upon tactical forces. Military police operations relieved combat forces of the burden of civilian handling, control, and ultimately any interference with tactical operations or sustainment. The volume of civilians presented military police with a complex challenge which they met successfully except in several situations. Those operational problems relating to structure have already been discussed, however, there was one additional operational issue. The absence of a Tenth Army policy for use of force with civilians failed to satisfy criteria established in FM 19-5. This planning failure may have resulted in unnecessary civilian casualties. The tactical environment was complicated by the Japanese use of civilians as shields during final attacks on American forces. It is not clear from the resources considered if a solution would have been drawn from a well defined policy on the use of force. It is clear that the absence of such a policy left soldiers and Marines to their own personal judgments. Military police involvement to stop troops from firing upon civilians indicates that judgment and resulting behavior was questionable to those present. It is certainly questionable today. The need for such a policy was further demonstrated by examples of military police accidentally killing civilians in security operations. Even though training attempted to avoid this problem by focusing on military police protection of civilians, legal and articulate policy was certainly required as prescribed in doctrine.

This issue provides the only real negative note for this mission area. It should not overshadow the accomplishment of approximately 3,000 military police who successfully collected, moved, interned, and cared for approximately 300,000 civilian Okinawans. The simple volume and associated complexity of such a task demonstrates the overall success achieved in this mission area.

Prisoner of war operations presented military police with many of the same requirements as civilian handling, but with only 3% of the volume. In spite of this lesser population, the organizational structure within the Island Command proved inadequate. As a result, the Island Command central inclosure failed to carry out the Tenth Army policy for segregation of prisoners; only officers were segregated. This was the only deficiency noted throughout both operational assessments. These operations successfully collected, moved, held, protected, and processed over 10,000 prisoners of war. Ultimately, this support was effective in spite of this minor problem.

Failure to conduct detailed planning for separate security missions created a planning void. Thus, security missions were not properly coordinated with other functional considerations prior to the campaign. This parallels those same security related deficiencies identified in the structural evaluation. Unplanned airfield security, command post security, and other critical site security competed with other mission areas for limited capabilities and focus. Even though these missions were generally successful, their unplanned nature impacted upon the quality of overall mission accomplishment. It is impossible to determine what other problems might have been avoided had planning and

coordination properly occurred. It is also impossible to determine how much better or expansive other types of support might have been had planning occurred. It is clear that military police security operations were credited with deterring and neutralizing Japanese attempts to disrupt operations in the Army and both Corps' rear areas. This problem was one of poor planning and not of operational execution.

Finally, detailed planning for law and order operations such as straggler control, was also neglected. Although general policies, prohibitions, responsibilities, and corrective actions were prescribed, military police did not plan for posts and patrols prior to landing. This planning may have been deliberately omitted since any significant need for general enforcement was not anticipated until later in the operation. In contrast, pilfering was clearly expected to manifest itself in the beachhead, yet specific military police plans were not available. Again, a planning failure did not render negative operational results. Law and order operations as with security operations were successfully executed and achieved successful results. This raises the question of how detailed planning should be prior to arrival in the area of operations.

The results of the Tenth Army military police operations were generally very successful, however, competition among mission areas for limited military police assets occasionally deprived more important mission areas of adequate support. The Tenth Army and specifically the Provost Marshal staff failed to continually prioritize these mission areas for given times in the operation. The absence of prioritization led to seemingly random focus and reaction among various units. Further, the Tenth Army never exercised operational control of these forces at the

Army-level in order to focus the military police effort and achieve mutual support for critical mission areas. This would have provided a possible solution for some of the issues resulting from inadequate or unavailable structure. Even though operational results were successful overall, more thorough planning and focus of subordinate military police support would have resulted in better coordination, economy of force, and synergy of capabilities throughout the Tenth Army. These units individually deserve much credit for their accomplishments in the face of inexperience and a challenging environment. They provided many examples of the best and most successful military police operations of their era.

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